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The Quality-Complementarity Hypothesis: 
Theory and Evidence from Colombia
* 
 
This paper presents a tractable formalization and an empirical investigation of the quality-
complementarity hypothesis, the hypothesis that input quality and plant productivity are 
complementary in generating output quality. We embed this complementarity in a general-
equilibrium trade model with heterogeneous, monopolistically competitive firms, extending 
Melitz (2003), and show that it generates distinctive implications for two simple, observable 
within-sector correlations − between output prices and plant size and between input prices 
and plant size − and for how those correlations vary across sectors. Using uniquely rich and 
representative data on the unit values of outputs and inputs of Colombian manufacturing 
plants, we then document three facts: (1) output prices are positively correlated with plant 
size within industries on average; (2) input prices are positively correlated with plant size 
within industries on average; and (3) both correlations are more positive in industries with 
more scope for quality differentiation, as measured by the advertising and R&D intensity of 
U.S. industries. The predicted and observed correlations between export status and input 
and output prices are similar to those for plant size. We present additional evidence that 
market power of either final-good producers or input suppliers does not fully explain the 
empirical patterns we observe. These findings are consistent with the predictions of our 
model and difficult to reconcile with alternative models that impose symmetry or homogeneity 
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The increasing availability of microdata on manufacturing plants has revealed extensive hetero-
geneity across plants, even within narrowly dened sectors. Among the established stylized facts
are that exporting plants are larger than non-exporters, that they have higher measured total
factor productivity, and that they pay higher wages, on average within industries.1 Melitz (2003)
provides a general-equilibrium trade model that allows for heterogeneity in productivity across
rms,2 is consistent with the rst two facts, and accounts elegantly for re-allocations of produc-
tion within industries in response to trade liberalization. The framework has rightly become the
workhorse model for analyzing the behavior of heterogeneous rms under monopolistic competi-
tion.
The elegance of the Melitz model comes at the cost of a number of simplications, however.
The treatment of inputs in particular is highly stylized: the lone input, labor, is assumed to
be homogeneous. The model thus has relatively little to say about the input choices of rms
and cannot account for the third stylized fact above, the greater average wage among exporters.
In addition, although the model can be interpreted in terms of quality-dierentiated outputs,
as we discuss below, the interpretation of the model that has become standard treats outputs
as symmetric. At the same time, plant-level datasets typically lack product-level information,
particularly on prices, and even the few datasets that contain information on output prices have
little information on the prices of material inputs. As a result, it has been dicult to evaluate
the importance of quality dierences at the product level, and much of the literature has carried
along the assumptions of homogeneous inputs and symmetric outputs with little discussion.
This paper focuses squarely on product-level heterogeneity and investigates a particular hy-
pothesis linking heterogeneity in productivity, heterogeneity in input quality, and heterogeneity in
output quality, which we refer to as the quality-complementarity hypothesis. The hypothesis holds
that input quality and plant productivity are complementary in generating output quality. The
theoretical part of the paper embeds this complementarity in a general-equilibrium trade model
with heterogeneous rms, extending the Melitz (2003) framework, and shows that the resulting
model carries distinctive implications for two simple, observable within-sector correlations | be-
tween output prices and plant size and between input prices and plant size | and for how those
1For a review of this literature, see Tybout (2003).
2In the Colombian data, we do not know which plants belong to which rms, and must conduct the analysis at
the level of plants. Hereafter we will treat plants as single-establishment rms, and use the terms plant and rm
interchangeably.
1correlations vary across sectors. An attractive feature of our model is that it remains tractable
in a general-equilibrium context while explicitly considering rms' choices of input and output
quality.
The empirical part of the paper draws on uniquely rich and representative product-level data
from Colombian manufacturing plants to test the cross-sectional predictions of the model. The
data, from yearly plant censuses over the period 1982-2005, contain detailed information on the
unit values and physical quantities of both inputs and outputs. To our knowledge, these data
represent the most complete source of product-level information in a nationally representative
plant dataset in any country. Using these data, we document three facts. First, within narrowly
dened sectors, output prices are positively correlated with plant size, on average. Second, within
narrowly dened sectors, input prices are positively correlated with plant size, on average. Third,
using a measure of the scope for quality dierentiation from Sutton (1991, 1998) | the advertising
and R&D intensity of industries in the U.S. | both of the above correlations are more positive
in industries with more scope for quality dierentiation. The correlations between export status
and input and output prices are similar to those for plant size. We also present evidence that
market power of nal-good producers or input suppliers does not fully explain the observed
patterns. These empirical ndings together are consistent with the predictions of our model and
are dicult to reconcile with models that impose symmetry or homogeneity of either set of goods.
We interpret the results as broadly supportive of the quality-complementarity hypothesis.
An important caveat is that we do not observe product quality directly but must make infer-
ences about quality from prices and quantities.3;4 In this sense, we follow Hummels and Klenow
(2005), who use information on prices and volumes of bilateral trade 
ows | in particular, the
fact that richer countries export greater volume at higher prices within 6-digit trade categories
| to infer that richer countries are likely to be producing higher-quality goods within categories.
Our nding that output prices and plant size are positively correlated within narrow sectors is
the plant-level analogue of that Hummels-Klenow result. As we discuss below, however, a num-
ber of plausible alternative models can account for this correlation without appealing to quality
dierences and are observationally equivalent to quality models in trade-
ow data or plant-level
3Although detailed product attributes can sometimes be observed directly within narrow sectors (see e.g. Gold-
berg and Verboven (2001)), such information is not available in nationally representative datasets.
4We express the main results in terms of correlations between prices and plant size, rather than prices and
physical quantities at the product level, because the possibility of spurious relationships due to measurement
error in physical quantities (discussed in Section 6) would require cumbersome qualications to the statement of
results. However, we show in Section 9.4 below that we nd similar results when using physical quantities and an
instrumental-variables strategy to address the measurement-error concern.
2data containing only output prices and quantities. An advantage of our data is that we observe
prices of inputs as well as outputs, and can use the relationship between input prices and plant
size, as well as variation in that relationship across sectors, to distinguish between the competing
models.
A second caveat is that our model uses functional forms which, although standard in the
trade literature, have a number of special properties. While these functional forms are particularly
useful in deriving closed-form solutions in general equilibrium, the complementarity between input
quality and plant productivity in generating output quality would be likely to yield similar cross-
sectional predictions under a variety of dierent demand and production specications. It is also
worth emphasizing that our empirical strategy does not rely on the particular functional forms
used in the model, and the estimates are likely to be similarly robust.
The quality-complementarity hypothesis carries a number of potentially important implica-
tions. Perhaps most importantly, the hypothesis suggests new channels through which inter-
national integration may aect industrial evolution in developing countries. If export markets
carry higher quality requirements than domestic markets, then as producers increase exports and
upgrade product quality we would expect them to increase quality demands on input suppliers,
which may in turn induce those suppliers to upgrade various aspects of their production processes.
Alternatively, a reduction of taris on imported inputs is likely to reduce the price of high-quality
inputs, which may in turn lead rms to upgrade the quality of nal goods they produce. Both of
these mechanisms are likely to aect the distribution of gains from international integration, even
within narrow industries, and hence the extent of political support for trade liberalization. In
addition, the fact that a scarcity of high-quality inputs may hinder the production of high-quality
nal goods suggests that the industrial upgrading process may require the upgrading of entire
complexes of suppliers and nal-good producers, not just of particular leading exporters.
Another potentially important implication of the quality-complementarity hypothesis is that
it provides a partial explanation for a familiar and well-established nding in labor economics,
the positive correlation between establishment size and wages, known as the \employer size-wage
eect" (Brown and Medo, 1989; Oi and Idson, 1999). To our knowledge, this paper is the rst
to present evidence from broadly representative data that this correlation also holds for material
inputs. The fact that the pattern holds for material inputs as well as labor lends weight to
the argument that the size-wage correlation at least in part re
ects dierences in labor quality,
and not solely institutions that are specic to the labor market. In addition, together with the
3observation that higher-productivity plants are more likely to select into export markets, the
quality-complementarity hypothesis oers a natural explanation for the fact that exporters pay
higher wages than non-exporters, the third stylized fact above.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses related literature. Section 3
presents a brief look at the data from two detailed sectors, to illustrate the main ideas of the
paper. Section 4 develops our model, embedding the quality-complementarity hypothesis in a
general-equilibrium setting with heterogeneous, monopolistically competitive rms. Section 5
describes the dataset. Section 6 describes our econometric strategy. Section 7 presents the main
results, examining all sectors together (Section 7.1) and how the price-plant size correlations vary
across sectors (Section 7.2). In Section 8, we consider alternative explanations for the empirical
patterns and undertake additional analyses that suggest that these hypotheses are not the full
explanation for the empirical patterns we observe. Section 9 presents a number of additional
robustness checks, and Section 10 concludes.
2 Related Literature
This paper is related to a number of existing studies in addition to the work mentioned above.
Complementarities among inputs in production have been emphasized by Sattinger (1979), Mil-
grom and Roberts (1990), Kremer (1993), Grossman and Maggi (2000), Acemoglu, Antr as, and
Helpman (2007), and Jones (2007) among others, although these papers do not focus on comple-
mentarities between inputs and plant productivity draws in the sense of Melitz (2003), as we do
here. In explicitly considering the quality choices of rms, we follow the seminal work of John
Sutton and Avner Shaked (Shaked and Sutton, 1982, 1987; Sutton, 1991, 1998, 2007), although
our paper places more emphasis on the variable costs of producing high quality than the xed
costs, and more emphasis on explaining cross-sectional price distributions among large numbers
of heterogeneous rms than on explaining the extent of market concentration.5
Verhoogen (2008) hypothesizes a complementarity between plant productivity and labor qual-
ity in producing output quality, but in the context of a partial-equilibrium model in which a
5We focus on variable costs | input prices | in large part because they are observable in the Colombian data,
unlike xed costs of raising quality. In the long run, it would clearly be desirable to combine an initial stage of sunk
investment in raising quality along the lines of Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1987) and Sutton (1991, 1998, 2007) with
the tractability of the Melitz (2003) framework in analyzing the behavior of large numbers of heterogeneous rms.
It is also worth noting that our constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) demand framework with no xed costs of
raising quality is poorly suited to analyzing market concentration, because it is dicult to reconcile with the fact
that in many industries the number of market players remains xed even as the market grows large. (See Sutton
(1991, pp. 70-71).)
4number of key relationships | in particular the wage-labor quality schedule and the extent of
consumer demand | are taken to be exogenous. The theoretical advance of the current paper, be-
yond generalizing the hypothesis to material inputs, is to set it in an tractable, general-equilibrium
framework.6 Empirically, the advantage of the current paper is that we observe output and input
prices and can conduct more stringent and direct tests of the hypothesis of complementarity.
Several studies use product price information from the U.S. Census of Manufactures for a
limited number of relatively homogeneous sectors for which unit values can be calculated on
a consistent basis. Roberts and Supina (1996, 2000), Syverson (2007), Horta csu and Syverson
(2007), and Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008) all report negative correlations between
plant size and output prices.7 A subset of the studies mentioned above use information on unit
values of material inputs, which are available on a consistent basis for an even more limited
number of inputs (Dunne and Roberts, 1992; Roberts and Supina, 1996, 2000; Syverson, 2007;
Horta csu and Syverson, 2007); none of these papers explicitly reports cross-sectional correlations
of material input prices with plant size. The only study we are aware of that explicitly considers
the correlation between non-labor input prices and plant size is Davis, Grim, Haltiwanger, and
Streitwieser (2006), which focuses on electricity prices and shows that prices paid by manufac-
turing plants are decreasing in purchase volume.8 An important advantage of our study over this
previous work is that we have access to consistently dened output and input prices for a much
broader set of sectors | indeed, for the universe of manufacturing plants with 10 or more workers
in Colombia. Below we show that our results are consistent with the U.S. ndings for the most
homogeneous sectors, but also that the most homogeneous sectors are not representative of the
Colombian manufacturing sector as a whole.
In independent work, Hallak and Sivadasan (2008) nd positive output price-plant size and
output price-export status correlations in Indian data, similar to the our rst nding mentioned
above.9 An advantage of the Colombian data is that they contain information on the unit values
6Verhoogen (2008) uses a non-homothetic, multinomial-logit demand specication in order to make transparent
the dependence of consumer willingness to pay for quality on income. While the CES demand specication in this
paper makes no such link, it has the advantages of tractability and greater comparability to the existing trade
literature.
7Aw, Batra, and Roberts (2001) use two cross-sections of plant-level data on output unit values from the Tai-
wanese electronics sector to investigate plant-level price dierences between goods sold on the export and domestic
market, but do not present evidence on cross-sectional price-plant size correlations.
8In an interesting case study of a tractor manufacturer in Pakistan, Andrabi, Ghatak, and Khwaja (2006) nd
that suppliers with greater relationship-specic assets receive both smaller orders and lower prices. The authors
argue that this is because such suppliers are also supplying lower-quality inputs. Given the nature of their data,
however, the authors are not able to compare input prices paid by dierent nal-good producers.
9Hallak and Sivadasan (2008) also develop a theoretical framework with two dimensions of heterogeneity and
minimum quality requirements for entering the export market; see footnote 18.
5of material inputs; as we mentioned above and discuss in more detail in Section 8 below, the
information on inputs is crucial for distinguishing the implications of quality models from a
number of competing explanations. Also related is the work of Abowd, Kramarz, and Moreau
(1996), who observe in French data that plants that charge higher output prices also employ
workers of higher quality, where quality is estimated as a worker xed eect in a regression that
also controls for rm xed eects and observable worker characteristics in employer-employer
data. Unlike in our paper, however, the authors do not take advantage of plant size or quantity
information to discriminate among competing theories, nor do they have information on material
inputs.10
In the context of the growth literature, this paper is related to theoretical work on quality
ladders (Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1992), although these models typically
predict that one rm captures the entire market in a sector and hence carry few implications for
cross-sectional price and plant-size distributions. In the empirical growth literature, our work is
related to Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2007), who use trade-
ow and aggregate data to show
that countries that export more sophisticated goods, as proxied by the average income level of all
countries exporting the good, grow faster in subsequent years.
In addition to the Hummels and Klenow (2005) paper discussed above, a number of papers
have used information on unit values in trade-
ow data to draw inferences about product quality.
Schott (2004) documents that imports into the U.S. from richer countries have higher unit values
than imports from poorer ones, within narrow product categories. Other notable contributions
in this vein include Rodrik (1994), Hummels and Skiba (2004), Hallak (2006), Choi, Hummels,
and Xiang (2006), Khandelwal (2007) and Hallak and Schott (2008). A general issue with this set
of studies is that it is not clear whether the patterns in trade-
ow data re
ect quality variation
across individual rms or variation across sub-sectors, for instance at the (unobserved) 12-digit
level. As a consequence, it is dicult to know what implications the studies carry for analyses
at the plant level. In addition, the trade-
ow data contain no information on inputs and are
vulnerable to the criticism that price dierences re
ect dierences in market power rather than
product quality.11
10We are aware of two other independent projects using producer-level output price information. In Mexican
data, Iacovone and Javorcik (2008) document that plants raise output prices in preparation for exporting, which
suggests that the quality-upgrading process highlighted by Verhoogen (2004, 2008) begins prior to entry into the
export market. Crozet, Head, and Mayer (2007) use price information and direct quality ratings on French wines
to test the implications of a quality-sorting model of trade. Neither of these projects has access to data on the unit
values of material inputs.
11Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2007), Halpern and Koren (2007) and and Eaton, Eslava, Kugler, and
6Finally, our work is also related to two recent papers relating unit values in trade-
ow data
to extensions of the Melitz (2003) model: Baldwin and Harrigan (2007) and Johnson (2007).
The key nding of these papers is that exports to more distant or dicult-to-reach markets have
higher unit values on average. This fact is dicult to explain with the standard interpretation
of the Melitz (2003) model, which would suggest that more productive rms both charge lower
prices and enter more distant markets than less productive rms. The fact is consistent with
the hypothesis that more productive rms produce higher-quality goods and charge higher prices,
a hypothesis that is explicitly present in the Verhoogen (2004, 2008) model as well as in the
variants of the Melitz model that Baldwin and Harrigan (2007) and Johnson (2007) present. The
hypothesis is also implicitly present in the Melitz (2003) model itself, given a suitable redenition
of quality units | a redenition alluded to (albeit not fully developed) in Melitz's original paper
(Melitz, 2003, p. 1699). Appendix A.2 spells out the \quality" version of the Melitz (2003) model,
shows how it relates to the model we present in the next section, and shows that it is isomorphic
to the Baldwin and Harrigan (2007) model if one abstracts from dierences in distance between
countries.12 As will become clear below, the key dierences between our quality model and
the quality-Melitz/Baldwin-Harrigan model are the allowance for heterogeneity of inputs and
the complementarity between plant productivity and input quality, which generate distinctive
implications for input prices. An additional dierence is that our framework treats product
quality as a choice variable of plants, rather than a deterministic function of plants' productivity
draws; this enables us to provide an account of how dierences in output quality distributions
emerge endogenously across sectors.
3 Illustrative Examples
In this section, we take a brief look at the data for two products, to illustrate the main ideas
of the paper. The products have been selected both because they dier in the extent of quality
dierentiation and because they have relatively simple production processes.
First, consider hollow bricks (ladrillos huecos), a common building material in Colombia,
Tybout (2007) have recently developed datasets based on customs declarations for international transactions that
include unit values at the plant level. These datasets open up a range of new research possibilities, but they have
the disadvantage that they contain unit-value information only for rms that engage in international transactions,
and only for the subset of transactions that cross borders. It is not clear to what extent the results for the minority
of plants that export or import in each industry can be generalized to the industry as a whole, and no price
comparisons can be made between rms that engage in international transactions and rms that do not.
12The Johnson (2007) model also carries implications similar to the quality Melitz model if one abstracts from
distance.
7similar to cinderblocks but made primarily of clay rather than concrete. The scope for quality
dierentiation in hollow bricks is arguably quite limited. Figure 1.A plots log real output unit value
for each plant-year observation against plant size, as measured by log employment (for reasons
discussed in Section 6 below), with both variables deviated from year means.13 Small x's indicate
non-exporting plants and small o's indicate exporting plants; consistent with the general pattern,
exporting plants in this sector are larger than non-exporters. We observe a negative relationship
between output price and plant size. Although less obvious in the graph, the relationship between
output price and export status is also negative. It is important to note that the price data are
noisy and the negative slope is only marginally signicant; the large number of observations in
the full dataset will be important in drawing statistical inferences with greater condence below.
Figure 1.B plots the log real unit value paid for common clay (arcilla com un), the main input into
hollow bricks, by producers of hollow bricks. In this case, input prices are negatively correlated
with plant size, suggesting that larger plants receive volume discounts or have greater bargaining
power with suppliers.
Second, consider men's socks, a product for which there is arguably more scope for quality
dierentiation. Figure 2.A plots log real output unit value against log employment. In this case we
observe a positive relationship between output prices and plant size. Although again less obvious,
the correlation between output unit value and export status is also positive. Figure 2.B plots the
log real price paid by producers of men's socks for raw cotton yarn, the main input into cotton
socks. Here we see a strong positive relationship between input price and plant size.14 Figure
2.C plots the log real price paid by producers of men's socks for another common input, cotton
thread; here again we see a strong positive relationship between input price and plant size.
The quality-complementarity hypothesis oers an intuitive explanation for these patterns: the
most productive rms use the highest-quality inputs, produce the highest-quality outputs, and
grow to be largest, but this mechanism only operates in sectors with sucient scope for quality
dierentiation. The following theoretical section provides a general-equilibrium formalization of
this intuition, and the empirical section investigates the corresponding patterns for the Colombian
manufacturing sector as a whole, showing not only that the price-plant size slopes are greater in
industries with more scope for quality dierentiation, but also that, on average, the manufacturing
13The data are from the years 1982-1994, since those are the years for which export status is observed; for more
details, see Section 5 and the data appendix.
14Note that men's socks sector also includes producers of non-cotton socks; for that reason the number of plant-
year observations in Figure 2.A is smaller than in Figure 2.B.
8sector is more like men's socks than like hollow bricks.
At this point, it is worth clarifying brie
y what we mean by product quality. Implicitly,
we are treating any product attribute that consumers value and hence are willing to pay for
as a component of product quality. In the theoretical section below, we assume that in each
country there is a single representative consumer; we are thus sidestepping the issue that dierent
consumers may value a given product attribute dierently. This may not be as restrictive as it
seems, however: Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1992) show that the demand patterns generated
by a Dixit-Stiglitz representative consumer can also be generated by a model with individual
consumers making discrete choices on the basis of utility functions with a random consumer-
product match term. In this view, the heterogeneous component of consumer tastes can be
interpreted as a mean-zero draw, and quality can be interpreted as the subset of product attributes
that are valued by all consumers.
It is important to note that we are not equating product quality with the price paid for the
product, nor are we arguing that quality dierences fully explain the price dispersion for inputs
and outputs observed, for instance, in Figures 1 and 2. In Section 8 below we consider a number
of other plausible models, some involving market-power dierences across plants, that may be
responsible for part of the price dispersion. We make the more limited argument that these
alternative models cannot be the complete explanation for the price dispersion, because they
are inconsistent with key empirical patterns, and hence that it is dicult to explain the set of
cross-sectional correlations we observe without reference to quality dierences among inputs and
outputs. In this paper, we do not construct quantitative estimates of product quality, because
such estimates would necessarily be specic to the particular functional forms of our theoretical
model, for which we have little a priori justication. Instead, we focus here on what we consider
to be the most robust theoretical predictions and empirical patterns to draw the arguably non-
model-specic inference that a complementarity between input quality and plant productivity in
generating output quality must be playing some (as-yet-unquantied) role.
4 Theory
This section develops a model of heterogeneous inputs, heterogeneous plant productivity, and het-
erogeneous outputs, extending the Melitz (2003) framework to accommodate a complementarity
between input quality and plant productivity in generating output quality.
94.1 Set-up
There are two symmetric countries; without loss of generality, we focus on one of them. There
are two sectors, a nal-good sector and an intermediate-input sector. Final goods are dier-
entiated, and the market structure is monopolistic competition. The intermediate-input sector
is perfectly competitive, with constant returns to scale. Both nal goods and inputs may have
quality dierences, in manners that will be made clear below.












where we make the standard assumption that  > 1; ! indexes varieties in the nal-good sector; 

represents the set of all dierentiated varieties available in the market (produced in either country);
 is a parameter capturing the elasticity of substitution between varieties, where we make the
standard assumption that  > 1; q(!) is the quality of variety !, assumed to be observable to
all; and x(!) is the quantity consumed. Consumer optimization yields the following demand for








where pO(!) is the price (the \output price") of variety !, P is an aggregate quality-adjusted
price index, and X is a quality-adjusted consumption aggregate of the varieties available on the
market.15 Note that demand is increasing in the quality and decreasing in the price of a particular
variety.
Like Melitz (2003), we begin with an inelastic labor supply L (measured in labor-hours) with
the hourly wage normalized to one. But we add the intermediate-input sector, which transforms
homogeneous labor-hours into intermediate inputs of dierent qualities. In the intermediate sec-


















where c is the quality of the intermediate input produced and l is the number of labor-hours used.
In other words, producing one unit of an intermediate input of quality c requires c labor-hours
and, given the wage normalization, entails cost c. There are no xed costs of production in this
sector. Let pI(c) be the price of an intermediate input of quality c. It will turn out that in
equilibrium the price of each intermediate input equals the marginal cost of producing the input:
pI(c) = c.
The simplest interpretation of the model, which we adopt here in the interest of clarity, is that
the intermediate-input sector produces only material inputs and workers are homogeneous. But a
valid alternative interpretation of the model is that the intermediate-input sector is an education
sector, and that c unskilled labor-hours are required to \produce" one labor-hour of skill c.16 In
either interpretation, the key point is simply that, from the perspective of nal-good producers,
there is a linear relationship between the quality of an intermediate input and the price of that
input.
To enter the nal-good sector, entrants must pay an investment cost, fe (measured in labor-
hours) in order to receive a productivity draw, . We refer to this draw as a plant's \capability,"
borrowing the term from Sutton (2007). We assume that capability is drawn from a Pareto




, with 0 < m  .17
Production in the nal-good sector is described by two functions, one describing the production
of physical units of output and the other describing the production of quality. We allow the
capability parameter to enter both equations: capability may reduce unit input requirements,
as productivity does in the standard interpretation of the Melitz model, or it may raise output
quality for a given set of inputs.18 The production of physical units is assumed to be F(n) = na,
16Although we abstract from life-cycle considerations, one could also think of c as the amortized per-period
portion of an initial investment in education at the beginning of a worker's career.
17Below we will impose a lower bound on the shape parameter, k, to ensure that the distribution of capability
draws has a nite variance. Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) impose a similar restriction.
18Sutton (2007) uses the term \capability" to refer to a pair of parameters, one re
ecting unit input requirements
and the other governing quality for a given set of inputs. Here we collapse the two dimensions of heterogeneity to
one. Hallak and Sivadasan (2008) maintain the two dimensions of heterogeneity. (See also Brooks (2006).) In future
work, we plan a structural estimation of a model like the current one, and for that purpose it will be important
to allow for additional dimensions of heterogeneity. Given the more limited goals of the current paper | deriving
simple reduced-form predictions for cross-sectional price-plant size correlations | it is not clear that the increased
model 
exibility outweighs the cost of added algebraic complication.
11where n is the number of units of inputs used and a is a parameter re
ecting the extent to which
capability lowers unit costs, with a > 0. The production of output quality is assumed to be given
by a CES combination of capability, , and input quality, c.19 It is convenient to parameterize
the contribution of capability as b (with b  0) and to parameterize the contribution of input
















The choices of multiplicative factor 1
2 and the quadratic form in c are convenient but not crucial.20
The parameter  re
ects the degree of complementarity between capability and input quality; as
 becomes more negative, the degree of complementarity increases. We impose the assumption
that  < 0. This ensures that q(;) is log-supermodular in  and c.21 Intuitively, returning to the
example of men's socks, we are assuming that the marginal increase in quality from using higher-
quality cotton yarn is greater for more capable entrepreneurs. We rule out the possibility that
plant capability and input quality are substitutes, for instance because more capable entrepreneurs
are particularly able to compensate for deciencies in yarn quality.22
The parameter b re
ects the technological ease or diculty in translating higher plant capabil-
ity into improved product quality. If b = 0 then superior capability does not translate into higher
quality and outputs will be symmetric across plants. A higher b re
ects a greater scope for quality
dierentiation.23 A high b corresponds loosely to what Khandelwal (2007) calls a long \quality
ladder" and more closely to what Sutton (1998) calls a high \escalation parameter".24 To keep the
model simple, we have not introduced a parameter capturing the willingness of consumers to pay
19Similar functional forms have been used by Sattinger (1979), Grossman and Maggi (2000), Acemoglu, Antr as,
and Helpman (2007), and Jones (2007), among others, to model complementarities among inputs.















then the conditions 0 <  < 1 and 
 > 1 would be sucient.
21Strictly speaking, to ensure complementarity of  and c (supermodularity of q(;), we need only that  < 1 The
stronger assumption that  < 0 will ensure that the second-order conditions for prot maximization are satised
below. For a very useful discussion of log-supermodularity in a trade context, see Costinot (2008).
22The assumption that entrepreneurial ability and input quality are substitutes in the production of output
quality would lead to the prediction of a negative correlation between plant size and input prices. This is not the
empirical pattern we observe in the empirical part of the paper below.
23In our illustrative examples in Section 3, we interpret the hollow bricks sector as having low b and the men's
socks sector as having a higher b.
24In the case of an industry with a single technological trajectory, Sutton's escalation parameter  varies inversely
with the elasticity of required xed and sunk investments (i.e. R&D and advertising expenditures) with respect to
the resulting quality, which he labels  (Sutton, 1998, Ch. 3).
12for product quality, which may also vary across sectors. We would expect such dierences across
sectors to play a role similar to dierences in technological possibilities for quality upgrading.
That is, one could interpret a higher b as indicating either greater technological ease in improving
quality or greater willingness of consumers to pay for product quality improvements, or both.
As in Melitz (2003), there is a xed cost of production, f, and an additional xed cost of
exporting, fx > f, in each period, both measured in labor-hours.25 There is an exogenous
probability of exit, , in each period. In the interests of simplicity, we assume that there are no
variable costs of trade. There is no cost of dierentiation and each plant that enters the nal-good
sector produces a distinct good. Hence  can be used to index both plants and varieties.
Final-good producers are assumed to be price-takers in intermediate-input markets, and all
face the same input price-input quality schedule pI(c); given the production function for physical
units of output, the cost of producing each additional physical unit is
pI(c)
a . Final-good producers
optimize over the choices of input quality, c, output price, pO, and which markets to enter. The
choice of input quality pins down the input price; input quality and  together determine output
quality; output quality and output price determine the number of units sold. Note that the
symmetry of countries implies that the optimal choices of c and pO are the same in both markets.
Let Z = 1 if the plant enters the export market, and 0 otherwise. Each plant in the nal-good


















a is marginal cost, x is given by (2), and q (an argument of x) is given by (5). Each
plant in the continuum of plants is small relative to the size of the market and ignores the eects
of its decisions on the aggregates X and P.
4.2 Characterization of Equilibrium
As in Melitz (2003), we focus on the unique steady-state equilibrium in which the distribution of
plant capabilities remains constant over time. As mentioned above, prot maximization and free
entry in the intermediate-input sector imply that pI(c) = c for all levels of input quality produced
in equilibrium.26 In the nal-good sector, the rst-order conditions for the plant's maximization
25As in Melitz (2003), it does not matter whether we think of fx as a per-period xed cost or as the amortized
per-period portion of a single, large sunk cost paid when rst entering the export market.
26In the input sector, prot of producing a unit of quality c is given by I(l;c) = pI(c)FI(l;c)   l =
pI(c)l
c   l.




c . Together with the condition that entry drives prots





















where c() and p
I() represent the input quality chosen and input price paid by plant  in
equilibrium, p






The solution for the remaining endogenous variables is similar to Melitz (2003), and the details
have been relegated to Appendix A.1 for that reason. To summarize brie
y, three conditions |
a zero-prot condition for remaining in the domestic market, a zero-prot condition for entering
the export market, and a free-entry condition that the ex ante expected present discounted value
of paying the investment cost to receive a capability draw is zero | pin down the cut-o values
for remaining in the domestic market, , and entering the export market, 
x. Since fx > f by
assumption, the cut-o for entering the export market is to the right of the cut-o for remaining
in the domestic market:  < 
x. Total revenues in the nal-good sector are equal to total labor
income; this pins down the mass of nal goods (and nal-good producers) in equilibrium.
Note in (7c) that ()
b
2 a is marginal cost and price is a xed multiplicative mark-up over
marginal cost, as is standard in models with Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) CES demand specications.
Note also that plant size, as measured by revenues, is unambiguously increasing in plant capability.
There is a discontinuous jump in revenues at the cut-o for entry into the export market, 
x, but
the relationship between revenues and capability is nonetheless monotonic.
While capability, , input quality, c(), and output quality, q() are unobservable in the
Colombian data, the above equations imply relationships between the variables that are observable
| input price, p
I(), output price, p
O(), and revenues, r(). Specically, (7a), (7c) and (7d)
imply the following input price-revenues and output price-revenues elasticities at all values of 
to zero, this implies pI(c) = c. The number of units of each quality produced is determined by demand from the
nal-good sector, discussed below.
27The fact that  drops out of these expressions is a consequence of the choices of the multiplicative factor
1
2
and exponent 2 in (5). In general, if the exponent were 
 in place of 2 (see footnote 20) then c() and hence p

O()
would depend on .













Several points are worth emphasizing. First, if there is no scope for quality dierentiation |
that is, if b = 0 | then this model reduces to the Melitz (2003) model. (To be precise, the model
reduces to the special case of the Melitz model with a Pareto distribution of productivity draws
and zero transport costs.) When b = 0, there is no complementarity between plant capability
and input quality, and all plants choose the same input quality, pay the same input price, and
produce the same output quality:
dlnp
I
dlnr = 0 and c() = p
I() = q() = 1. Marginal cost
is unambiguously declining in plant capability, since capability reduces unit input requirements.
Because the mark-up is a constant multiplicative factor, output price p
O() also declines in . In
the standard interpretation of the Melitz model, p
O() is taken to represent observed output prices
per physical unit. Thus the standard interpretation predicts a negative correlation between output




. Melitz (2003) points out that his model is consistent
with quality dierentiation given a suitable choice of quality units. In particular, if we interpret
p
O() as re
ecting price in quality units rather than physical units, the model can generate a zero
or positive correlation between observed output price in physical units and plant size. (Appendix
A.2 spells out this argument in detail.) But again, since there is no complementarity between
plant capability and input quality, the model predicts zero correlation between input prices and
plant size.
Second, if there is some scope for quality dierentiation | if b > 0 | then the complemen-
tarity between plant capability and input quality generates positive relationships between plant
capability  and both input price p
I and output quality q. Given that plant size, as measured by
revenues, is unambiguously increasing in , the model thus predicts a positive correlation between




Third, if b > 0, there are two osetting in
uences on the relationship between marginal cost
and  and hence on the relationship between output prices and marginal cost. On one hand,
higher- plants choose higher quality inputs that carry a higher price. On the other hand, higher-
 plants have lower unit input requirements and lower marginal cost. At suciently low values of
b, the input-requirement-reducing eect will dominate, and output prices will be declining in plant
15capability, , and hence in plant size. At suciently high values of b, the quality-complementarity
eect will dominate, and output prices will be increasing in  and hence in plant size. Formally,
from (8b), the output price-plant size slope is negative for b < 2a and positive for b > 2a.
Fourth, both the input price-plant size slope and the output price-plant size slope are predicted
















Fifth, since the cut-o for entry into the export market is to the right of the cut-o for entry
into the domestic market, export status is positively correlated with , and we have the same
predictions for the correlations of output and input prices with export status as for the correlations
with plant size.28
As a nal note, we acknowledge that the prediction that output quality is positively corre-
lated with plant size (as long as b > 0) may seem implausible to rich-country consumers of, for
example, French wines or Swiss watches, sectors in which the most expensive goods are produced
by small producers. But while it may well be that this model fails to describe quality choices and
the extreme high-quality end of many industries, it appears that it does capture an important
characteristic of industrial sectors in countries at roughly Colombia's level of development. For
instance, Verhoogen (2008) nds that larger plants in Mexico were more likely to have ISO 9000
certication, an international production standard commonly interpreted as a measure of product
quality. We will also see below that the positive plant size-quality relationship is consistent with
our ndings in the Colombian data.
To summarize, our model makes the following testable predictions: (1) a negative correlation
between output prices and plant size (or export status) in sectors with the least scope for quality
dierentiation (b < 2a); (2) a positive correlation between output prices and plant size (or export
status) in sectors with the most scope for quality dierentiation (b > 2a); (3) a zero or small
positive correlation between input prices and plant size (or export status) in low-b sectors; and
(4) a greater positive correlation between input prices and plant size (or export status) in high-
b sectors. These predictions stand in contrast to the standard Melitz model, which predicts a
28Note that the symmetry between countries in this model implies that if plants enter the export market they will
sell the same amount in the export market as in the domestic market. Thus the model does not predict a positive
correlation of plant size and the export share of sales, conditional on exporting. Nonetheless, below we also use the
export share of sales as an indicator of export status, partly for the purposes of comparison with existing results in
the literature, and partly because it is not dicult to imagine extensions to our model in which the export share
and plant capability would be positively related, for instance if capability reduced per-unit export costs as well as
unit input requirements or if plants exported higher-quality goods with higher prices to richer consumers in foreign
markets.
16negative output price-plant size correlation and a zero input price-plant size correlation, and to
the \quality" Melitz model, which is consistent with a positive output price-plant size correlation
but again predicts a zero input price-plant size correlation. We now turn to the data to test these
predictions. We will return to a discussion of alternative theoretical models in Section 8 below.
5 Data
The data we use are from the Encuesta Anual Manufacturera (EAM) [Annual Manufacturing
Survey], collected by the Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estad stica (DANE), the
Colombian national statistical agency. The dataset can be considered a census of manufacturing
plants with 10 or more workers.29 Data including product-level information are available for the
1982-2005 period. Data on exports and imports, as well as employment and earnings of blue-collar
and white-collar workers, are available on a consistent basis only for 1982-1994. We construct two
separate plant-level unbalanced panels, a 1982-2005 panel and a 1982-1994 panel. We observe
approximately 4,500-5,000 plants in each year.
In conjunction with this standard plant survey, DANE also collects information on the value
and physical quantity of each output and input of each plant, which is used to calculate national
producer price indices. A unit value for each plant-product-year observation can then be calculated
by dividing value (revenues or expenditures) by physical quantity. The unit value represents an
average price paid or charged by a plant over a year; hereafter we will (somewhat loosely) use
the terms unit value and price interchangeably. The product classication scheme is based on
the 4-digit International Standard Industrial Classication (ISIC) revision 2; DANE then adds
four Colombia-specic digits. We observe approximately 4,000 distinct product codes in the
data. The rst important advantage of these data is that they contain values and physical
quantities of all inputs and all outputs of all manufacturing plants with 10 or more workers in
Colombia. The second important advantage is that DANE analysts have been extremely careful
about maintaining consistent units of measurement within product categories. DANE dictates
to plants which measurement units to use. If plants report using alternative units, then DANE
follows up to request that the plant report using the correct units. If the plant insists that it is
not possible to report using the units dictated by DANE, DANE creates a new product category
29As mentioned above, we do not have access to rm-level data or information on which plants belong to which
rms. Details of the survey sampling design are discussed in Appendix B.2.
17for the good using the new units.30 Thus, for example, there exist two 8-digit product categories
corresponding to corrugated cardboard boxes (cajas de carton acanalado): product code 34121010
refers to corrugated cardboard boxes measured in kilograms; product code 34121028 refers to
corrugated cardboard boxes measured in number of boxes. Similarly, product code 35123067
refers to weed killers and herbicides measured in kilograms, and product code 35123075 refers
to weed killers and herbicides measured in liters. Units of measurement are truly homogeneous
within categories. This fact, the fact that inputs are included as well as outputs, and the fact
that product-level information is available for the entire population of manufacturing plants with
10 or more workers make the Colombian data unique, arguably better-suited to analyzing our
research question than any dataset in any other country.
Although the Colombian data are of high quality relative to Colombia's level of development,
the data still contain a fair amount of noise, like plant-level datasets in other developing countries.
We undertake an extensive procedure to clean the data and reduce the in
uence of outliers. An
important step in this process is \winsorizing" the data, recommended by Angrist and Krueger
(1999); the procedure is to set all values below a lower bound, for instance the 1st percentile, to the
value at the lower bound, and all values above an upper bound, for instance the 99th percentile, to
the value at the upper bound. In addition, we have recalculated results using a variety of dierent
bounds for the winsorizing procedure as well as a number of dierent strategies for dealing with
the remaining outliers, and have found the results we report to be robust. See Appendix B.1
for variable denitions and Appendix B.2 for full details on the cleaning and processing of the
datasets.31
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the plant-level data in our two panels, the 1982-1994
unbalanced panel and the 1982-2005 unbalanced panel. Consistent with patterns for the U.S.
documented by Bernard and Jensen (1995, 1999), exporting plants are larger, in terms of both
sales and employment, and pay higher wages; also, a minority of plants export and conditional
on exporting, plants derive a minority of their sales from the export market. Consistent with
patterns for Taiwan (Aw and Batra, 1999) and Mexico (Verhoogen, 2008), exporting plants have
a higher white-collar-to-blue-collar wage ratio. Exporting plants produce in a larger number of
30Source: personal communication with Juan Francisco Mart nez, Luis Miguel Su arez, and German P erez of
DANE.
31The plant-level information in the EAM has also been used in, for instance, Roberts and Tybout (1997),
Clerides, Lach, and Tybout (1998), and Das, Roberts, and Tybout (2006). The product-level information has
been used by Eslava, Haltiwanger, Kugler, and Kugler (2004, forthcoming, 2006, 2007) in studies that focus on the
eects of market reforms on productivity, plant turnover, and factor adjustments, rather than on price-plant size
correlations or quality dierentiation.
18distinct output categories and purchase from a larger number of distinct input categories than
non-exporters.32
Table 2 reports summary statistics for the product-level information in the 1982-2005 panel,
by ISIC major group (3-digit). Column 1 reports the number of distinct 8-digit products in each
3-digit group. Columns 2 and 5 report the average number of distinct plants selling or purchasing
each product in the group in each year, respectively. Columns 3 and 6 report the within-product
standard deviation of log real prices for each product as output or input, respectively. Columns
4 and 7 report the within-product-year standard deviation of log real prices for each product as
output or input, respectively.33 We note that there is a fair amount of variation across sectors
both in the number of selling or purchasing plants per product and in the extent of within-product
price dispersion.
6 Econometric Strategy
Our baseline econometric model is the following:
lnpijt = t + Xjt
 + it + rt + k + "ijt (9)
where i, j, and t index goods, plants, and years, respectively; lnpijt is the log real unit value of a
good; t is a year-specic intercept; Xjt is a measure of plant size; it is a product-year eect; rt
and k are region-year and industry eects, respectively;34 it is a product-year eect; and "ijt is
a mean-zero disturbance. We run regressions separately for output prices and input prices.
The coecient of interest in these regressions is 







dlnr from (8a) and (8b). It is worth emphasizing that the estimates of 
 re
ects correlations,
not causal eects of plant size on prices. Indeed, our argument is precisely that both plant size and
prices are determined by unobserved heterogeneity in plant capability. Nonetheless, the estimates
32The fact that exporters produce in more distinct output categories than non-exporters is consistent with the
prediction of the multi-product-rm theory of Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2006b) and the patterns documented
in U.S. data by Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2006a).
33The within-product standard deviation is the standard deviation of the residuals from a regression of log real
unit value on a full set of product dummies. The within-product-year standard deviation is the standard deviation
of the residuals from a regression of log real unit value on a full set of product-year dummies.
34Note that it is not redundant to have industry eects in this regression, even though product-year eects are
included, because there is not a perfect mapping from product categories to industries. Plants are assigned to
industries based on the relative importance of all the products they produce, and two plants producing the same
product may belong to two dierent industries, depending on the plants' product mixes. For details, see Appendix
B.2.
19of 
 are informative in the sense that they help us to discriminate between competing models with
contrasting predictions for the cross-sectional correlations. In some specications, we estimate (9)
with an indicator for export status or the export share of sales as the Xjt variable, in place of
plant size. In others, we interact Xjt with a sector-level measure to examine how the price-plant
size slope varies across sectors.
The product-year eects, it, absorb all variation in prices of particular products that is
common across plants. The coecient 
 in each regression is identied on the basis of within-
product-year variation | that is, on a comparison of prices between plants of dierent sizes
producing or consuming the same product in a given year. In this way we avoid the diculty that
we have no metric with which to compare unit values across products.
A natural measure of plant size is gross output; this is in fact the standard measure of plant
size used by DANE, measured as total sales plus net intra-rm transfers plus net change in
inventories. Measurement error in gross output is a potential concern, however. To the extent that
the measurement error is classical, it may simply attenuate coecient estimates toward zero. But
non-classical measurement error, generating unpredictable biases, is also a possibility. In addition,
revenues represent output quantities times output prices; a positive coecient may simply re
ect
the presence of output prices on both sides of the equation, rather than the theoretical relationship
we are trying to estimate. To address these concerns, we use employment as an alternative measure
of plant size. Employment has the advantage that measurement error is likely to be less severe
and, importantly, uncorrelated with reports of values and quantities of outputs and inputs. It
also has the advantage that it does not mechanically incorporate output prices. We use log total
employment as an instrument for log total output in an instrumental-variables (IV) procedure;
under the assumption that the measurement errors in gross output and total employment are
uncorrelated, the IV estimator will yield consistent estimates of the theoretical elasticities of
interest.35
Observations at the plant-product-year level are likely not to be independent either across
products within plant-years or across years within plants. For this reason, we cluster errors at the
plant level. The number of observations for the purposes of calculating standard errors is thus
eectively equal to the number of distinct plants. We report the number of distinct plants (i.e.
35Concerns about measurement error explain why we do not simply regress unit values on physical quantities at
the product level. Unit values are calculated by dividing total value produced (or consumed) by quantity. Hence
any measurement error in quantities will generate a spurious negative correlation between quantity and unit value,
a problem pointed out in the context of household surveys by Deaton (1988). We return to this issue in Section 9.4
below.
20clusters) as well as the number of plant-product-year observations used in each regression.
7 Results
7.1 Baseline Estimates
Panel A of Table 3 presents estimates of equation (9) with the log real output price as the
dependent variable. Columns 1 and 2 use log total output and log employment, respectively,
as the measures of plant size. Column 3 reports the IV estimate of the coecient on log total
output using log employment as the instrument for log total output. The IV estimate for log
total output is slightly larger than the OLS estimate, consistent with the observation above
that measurement error in gross output is generating attenuation bias. The coecient on log
employment is quite close to the IV estimate for total output, consistent with the hypothesis that
employment is measured with less error than gross output. The coecient estimates are highly
statistically signicant, and indicate that output prices are positively correlated with plant size
on average. The price and plant size variables are in log terms and the coecients on plant size
can be interpreted as elasticities. Column 2 suggests, for instance, that 10% greater employment
is associated with .26% higher output prices.
Panel B of Table 3 presents the analogous regressions with the log real input price as the
dependent variable. In moving from Column 1 to Columns 2 and 3, the coecient on plant size
falls slightly. This suggests a non-classical measurement error bias.36 But again, the important
message of those columns is that input prices are positively correlated with plant size on average.
The estimates suggest that 10% greater plant size is associated with .11-.12% higher prices paid
for material inputs.37
Table 4 uses the 1982-1994 panel, in which export status is observed, to estimate correlations
between export status and output and input prices. To simplify the presentation of results,
hereafter we focus on the reduced-form regressions with log employment as the key co-variate;
the IV estimates are similar. Results for output prices are in Panel A, and for input prices are
36One possibility is the following. Suppose that a \producer" re-sells (without further transformation) a good
produced by a \supplier", reports the money paid to the supplier as input expenditure, reports sales of the good
in total revenues, but does not include the number of physical units in quantity of the good produced. Then a
regression of input unit value on gross output will yield a positively biased coecient. Other measurement biases
are possible.
37Note that the output price-plant size relationship estimated in Panel A is steeper than the input price-plant
size relationship in Panel B, suggesting that protability may be increasing in plant size as well. We will see in
Table 9 below, however, that this dierence is not robust.
21in Panel B. For comparison purposes, Column 1 of each panel presents a regression with log
employment as the key co-variate, comparable to Column 2 of Table 3; the results are similar
to those for the longer 1982-2005 panel. The results in Column 2 indicate that both output and
input prices are higher among exporters. On average, exporters (i.e. plants with non-zero exports)
have approximately 11% greater output prices and 3.7% greater input prices than non-exporters.
In Column 3, with the export share of revenues as the key co-variate, the coecient is positive
and signicant for output prices and positive but not signicant for input prices. The share of
revenues derived from exports seems generally to have less explanatory power than the indicator
for entry into the export market.38 Caution is warranted in interpreting the results in Columns 4
and 5, since, if one believes our theoretical framework, both employment and export status re
ect
a single underlying capability parameter, , and are likely to be collinear. Subject to that caveat,
the results in Columns 4 indicate that being an exporter is associated with both higher output
prices and higher input prices, even conditional on plant size.39 Again, the results for export
share in Column 5 are less robust, especially for input prices.
The one input for which unit values are commonly observed in plant-level datasets is labor. To
compare our results for material inputs to results for employee wages, Table 5 presents regressions
that are similar to those in Columns 1-3, Panel B, Table 4 but with earnings of all employees,
blue-collar employees, white-collar employees, and the log earnings ratio, respectively, as the
dependent variables. We see clear evidence that the earnings of both blue-collar and white-collar
workers, as well as the relative earnings of white-collar workers, are greater in larger plants and
in plants with more exports. The positive wage-plant size relationship is a robust and familiar
fact (Brown and Medo, 1989; Oi and Idson, 1999), and the positive wage-exporting relationship
is also consistent with long-established results (Bernard and Jensen, 1995, 1999). The positive
relationships between wage inequality and plant size and between wage inequality and exporting
in Column 4 are less well known, but are also consistent with ndings from Taiwan (Aw and
Batra, 1999) and Mexico (Verhoogen, 2008).
38Recall that the theory literally predicts no variation in export share conditional on exporting. The important
theoretical point is that export status is correlated with  and hence plant size, not necessarily that the export
share is.
39These results are consistent with the results of Hallak and Sivadasan (2008) in Indian data mentioned above.
The fact that their theoretical model contains two dimensions of heterogeneity means that it is able to provide a
coherent account of the nding of systematically higher prices among exporters conditional on plant size.
227.2 Comparison Across Industries
The results above indicate that output and input prices are positively correlated with plant size
when we constrain the slope coecient to be the same across industries, but this leaves open the
possibility that there are signicant dierences across sectors. As discussed in Section 4 above,
our model would lead us to expect a negative output price-plant size correlation and a zero or
low input price-plant size correlation in homogeneous industries yet strongly positive correlations
in industries with more scope for quality dierentiation.
Our measure of the scope for quality dierentiation at the industry level is the ratio of total
industry advertising and R&D expenditures to total industry sales for U.S. rms from the 1975
U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Line of Business Survey. The Line of Business Program,
which was in existence from 1974 to 1977, was unique in that it required rms to break down
advertising and R&D expenditures by industry, as opposed to reporting consolidated gures at the
rm level. As a consequence, the data are generally perceived to be the most accurate industry-
level information on advertising and R&D expenditures, and have been used in a large number of
studies, including Cohen and Klepper (1992), Brainard (1997), Sutton (1998), and Antr as (2003).
In the context of a model with xed costs of improving quality, Sutton (1998) demonstrates
rigorously that there is a mapping between the (unobserved) scope for quality dierentiation in
an industry and the (observed) extent of xed investments in raising quality, which we measure
here by the advertising and R&D/sales ratio.40 Although we use a dierent model in this paper,
the same intuition carries through: if incurring greater costs to raise consumer willingness to pay
is ineective, prot-maximizing rms will not incur the costs; if such costs are incurred by prot-
maximizing rms, it must be that they are eective. Under the assumption of optimal behavior
by rms, we can infer that the scope for raising consumers' willingness to pay | that is, the
scope for quality dierentiation | is greater in industries where rms invest more in advertising
and R&D. The advertising/sales ratio may arguably be more closely tied to consumer willingness
to pay than the R&D/sales ratio, so we also run separate regressions with the advertising ratio
alone. We converted the information on advertising and R&D expenditures and sales from the
FTC industry classication (which approximates the 1972 U.S. Standard Industrial Classication)
to the ISIC revision 2 4-digit level using verbal industry descriptions.
A potential concern with using advertising intensity and advertising and R&D intensity is
that they may re
ect horizontal rather than vertical dierentiation. Theoretically, one might well
40See Theorem 3.3, the remark immediately following, and footnote 12 in Sutton (1998, Ch. 3).
23expect sectors with greater horizontal dierentiation to have greater price-plant size correlations;
in our model, if the scope for quality dierentiation is suciently large (b > 2a), then a greater
degree of horizontal dierentiation (a lower ) will give rise to steeper output price-plant size
and input price-plant size slopes.41 Our primary strategy for addressing this concern is to control
explicitly for horizontal dierentiation using the widely used Rauch (1999) dierentiation measure,
based on whether a good is traded on a commodity exchange or has a quoted price in industry
trade publications; as a robustness check, we conduct a similar analysis using an alternative
measure of horizontal dierentiation, from Gollop and Monahan (1991) (see Section 9.2 below).
Details of the construction of the Rauch (1999) measure and conversion to the ISIC rev. 2 industry
categories, which generated some fractional values, are in Appendix B.2. Table 6 reports summary
statistics on advertising intensity, advertising and R&D intensity, and the Rauch (1999) index, by
ISIC major group. The table also reports summary statistics on Herndahl indices for producers
and suppliers, which will be discussed below in Section 8.
We report the results using the dierentiation measures in Table 7. Because of slippage in the
concordance process, we are not able to calculate the dierentiation measures for several 4-digit
industries, and the number of observations is reduced. For comparison purposes, Columns 1 and
6 report specications similar to Table 3, Column 2, Panels A and B, for the modied sample;
the point estimates are not statistically dierent from those in the earlier table. In Columns 2-3
and 7-8, we include the interaction of log employment with the advertising/sales ratio and the
advertising and R&D/sales ratio corresponding to the output industry of each Colombian plant.42
The results are consistent with the predictions of our model above: the output price-plant size
slope and the input price-plant size slope are signicantly more positive in industries with more
scope for quality dierentiation.
Columns 4-5 and 9-10 control for dierences in horizontal dierentiation by including an
interaction of plant size with the Rauch (1999) measure.43 Including the interaction with the
















< 0 and hence that the slopes are
increasing in the extent of horizontal dierentiation.
42The denition of output industry diers slightly between Columns 2-3 and 7-8. When the output price is the
dependent variable, we dene output industry to be simply the rst four digits from the 8-digit product code for
each plant-product-year observation. When the input price is the dependent variable, this is not possible, because
particular inputs are not associated with particular outputs. Instead, we use the ISIC 4-digit category of the
corresponding plant, which is calculated as the industry in which the plant derives the largest share of its revenues.
For details, see Appendix B.2.
43Note that any dierences in horizontal dierentiation that aect all plants equally are already captured by the
product-year and industry eects; the key question is whether horizontal dierentiation aects the price-plant size
slopes, and that is what the interaction term picks up.
24Rauch measure has little eect on the coecient estimates for the interactions with advertising
intensity and advertising and R&D intensity. The estimates for these interactions in Columns
4-5 and 9-10 are not statistically distinguishable from the estimates in Columns 2-3 and 7-8,
respectively. Note that the coecients on log employment without interactions in Columns 4-5
and 9-10 are estimates of the price-plant size slopes in the most homogeneous industries, that is,
industries for which both advertising and R&D intensity and the Rauch measure are zero. In
Columns 4-5, we see that the estimated output price-plant size slope in the most homogeneous
industries is negative and statistically signicant. In Columns 9-10, we see that the estimated
input price-plant size slope in the most homogeneous industries, although positive, is eectively
zero. These estimates are consistent with the predictions of our theoretical model. The results
for the uninteracted log employment term in Columns 4-5 of Table 7 are also consistent with
previous ndings of negative price-plant size correlations for homogeneous goods in U.S. data by
Roberts and Supina (1996, 2000), Syverson (2007), Horta csu and Syverson (2007), and Foster,
Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008) discussed in Section 2 above.
8 Alternative Explanations
This section considers two alternative types of explanations for the price-plant size correlations
we observe: models with plant-specic demand shocks and market power in input markets, and
models with perfect competition without quality dierences.
8.1 Plant-Specic Demand Shocks and Market Power in Input Sectors
A common approach to inferring product quality from output prices and quantities is to dene
quality as any factor that shifts the demand curve for a product outward. But there are many
factors that may lead to greater demand for the products of a particular plant that do not
correspond to increases in the valuation of the products by consumers, and hence not to our notion
of product quality. One example might be favors from a well-placed government procurement
ocial. Another might be collusive agreements between particular plants not to compete head-on
in particular markets. Although in Dixit-Stiglitz-type frameworks such shocks would typically not
aect output prices since they would not aect marginal costs, in the context of other demand
systems it is quite plausible that such idiosyncratic shocks would lead plants both to raise prices
and to increase output. For example, in the framework of Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson
25(2008), which is based on a demand system similar to that of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) with
endogenous mark-ups, plant-specic demand shocks unrelated to quality can have such an eect.44
Plant-specic demand shocks pose a challenge to the attempt to draw inferences about quality
because they may generate a positive output price-plant size correlation even in the absence of
heterogeneity in product quality. In other words, under some parameter values, the implications
of the plant-specic demand shocks story and the quality story for the output price-plant size
correlation are observationally equivalent.45
The implications of standard non-quality-related demand shocks stories and our quality model
diverge when it comes to input prices, however. In Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008),
for instance, plants are subject to idiosyncratic input price shocks, but high input prices are
unambiguously bad for plants: higher input costs lead to high output prices (at the same quality
level) and reduced output. This mechanism generates a negative correlation between input prices
and plant size. While it is possible that a positive shock to plant-specic demand could coincide
with a positive shock to plant-specic input prices, in the Foster et al. framework there is no
explicit mechanism that would lead this to happen systematically.46
An extension of the Foster et al. framework could generate a systematically positive input
price-plant size correlation. Consider the possibility that plants have monopsony power in input
markets and face upward-sloping supply curves for inputs. In this case, a plant-specic demand
shock will generate an increase in derived demand for inputs, which will in turn tend to lead plants
to pay a higher input price. This eect could oset the eect of shocks to input prices discussed
in the previous paragraph, and generate a positive input price-plant size correlation overall, even
in the absence of quality dierentiation. We have two responses to this objection. First, this
44In the model of Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008), there are two osetting eects. On one hand, demand
shocks tend to induce a positive output price-plant size correlation. On the other, greater productivity tends to
induce a negative price-plant size correlation, as in the standard Melitz (2003) model. Which eect will dominate
is not clear a priori. Empirically, the authors nd a negative, insignicant correlation between price and several
measures of total output in the homogeneous sectors they focus on (Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson, 2008, Table
1).
45In Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), mark-ups are larger in more productive plants, but do not completely oset
the lower production costs in such plants, and output price is predicted to be negatively related to plant size. One
might imagine a \quality" interpretation of the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) model, similar to the quality Melitz
model discussed above, in which output prices are positively correlated with plant size. Our response in this case
is similar to our response to the quality Melitz and Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008) cases: such a model
would be dicult to reconcile with the input price-plant size correlations we observe.
46A related but distinct hypothesis is that some plants pay higher input prices not because of an idiosyncratic
shock for a given input, but because they buy inputs that have gone through more stages of processing, and hence
require fewer stages of processing when be transformed into outputs. We have two responses. First, in this story,
if outputs dier primarily in how many processing stages are performed by a plant itself vs. by its input suppliers,
then it is not clear why output prices would vary systematically with input prices. Second, it is not clear why
more-processed inputs would be systematically associated with larger plants.
26mechanism would not lead us to expect either the output price-plant size correlation or the input
price-plant size correlation to increase with the scope for quality dierentiation; it is not clear, in
other words, how the story would account for the results in Table 7. Second, we note that the
mechanism would predict a zero input price-plant size correlation in sectors in which purchasers
have no monopsony power, where plants presumably face 
at, or very nearly 
at, input supply
curves. We test this implication directly below.
A related alternative explanation is that plants are subject to plant-specic demand shocks
but that suppliers have market power in input markets. Within industries, plants facing positive
demand shocks for their output may face lower elasticities of output demand, which may in turn
lead them to be less sensitive to the prices of inputs. If suppliers have market power, they may
optimally charge higher prices to these less price-sensitive producers. Halpern and Koren (2007)
present a model with this feature, which they call \pricing-to-rm." This mechanism is consistent
with both a positive correlation of output prices and plant size and a positive correlation of input
prices and plant size. Note again, however, that the mechanism would not lead us to expect either
the output price-plant size correlation or the input price-plant size correlation to increase with
the scope for quality dierentiation, as we saw in Table 7. Note also that the mechanism again
predicts a zero input price-plant size correlation in the most competitive input sectors.
To test the predictions of these alternative models, we construct three dierent measures of
market power in input markets. First, we construct a standard Herndahl index for suppliers
of each 8-digit input, dened as the sum of squared market shares of producers of the input.
Second, we construct a Herndahl index for purchasers of each 8-digit input, dened as the sum
of squared shares of expenditures on the input by dierent plants. Note that it is not possible to
create such a Herndahl purchaser index in standard datasets in which material input purchases
are not observed.47 Third, we take a plant's share of total expenditures on a given input as
a measure of monopsony power for the plant.48 This measure varies within sector, unlike the
Herndahl indices. It is likely to be correlated with plant size but not perfectly so, since input
mixes vary across plants. The mean values of the Herndahl indices by ISIC major group are
reported in Columns 4-5 of Table 6.
Table 8 presents results for input prices using various combinations of these market power
measures. The number of plants for which all three market power measures can be constructed is
47Unfortunately, we do not observe which plants purchase from which input suppliers. Clearly, such information
would allow one to construct more precise measures of market power.
48We are grateful to Andrew Foster for suggesting this measure.
27smaller than the number used in Table 3 above, because some plants only use non-manufacturing
inputs for which the Herndahl supplier index cannot be constructed. For comparison purposes,
Column 1 replicates Column 2 in Table 3, Panel B for the reduced sample. The coecient on
the interaction of the Herndahl supplier index and log employment (in Columns 2, 5, 6 and
8) is negative and signicant.49 That is, the input price-plant size slope is less steep in input
sectors in which suppliers have more market power. This result contradicts the pricing-to-rm
hypothesis. The coecient on the plant purchaser share is uniformly positive and signicant.
Although the coecient on the interaction of the Herndahl purchaser index is not robust, the
point estimates are positive when the purchaser share is not also included. These two results are
consistent with the hypothesis that purchasers have monopsony power and face upward-sloping
supply curves for inputs, on average. But the important point of this table is that the coecient
on uninteracted log employment remains positive and highly signicant throughout. That is, even
in input sectors that approach zero purchaser and/or supplier concentration, and even controlling
for the expenditure share of purchasers in particular markets, the positive input price-plant size
correlation is robust. While producer monopsony power may well be part of the explanation of
the positive input price-plant size correlation, it appears that it cannot be the whole story.50
8.2 Perfect-Competition Models
One might also ask whether the price-plant size correlations we observe could be explained by mod-
els of perfect competition without appealing to dierences in product quality. Perfect competition
can be reconciled with a non-degenerate distribution of plant sizes if plants have heterogeneous
costs but marginal costs increase with output, as in the span-of-control model of Lucas (1978).
If plants are producing the same good in such models, however, then they expand output until
price equals marginal cost and in equilibrium all plants producing the good have the same price
and costs. Thus to explain the price-plant size correlations in the context of perfect competition,
one must assume that plants in the same \sector" are actually producing dierent goods. But if
plants with dierent prices are assumed to be producing dierent goods, then it is not clear why
49Note that the Herndahl indices without interactions are collinear with the product-year eects and therefore
omitted.
50An additional piece of evidence on the supplier market power story was reported in Table 5 above. One input
in which there is scope for quality dierentiation and for which suppliers arguably have little market power is
unskilled labor. Union density in Colombia is low by Latin American standards; the unionization rate in 2002
was 5.2% overall, and 4.7% in the private sector (Farn e, 2004). In Table 5 we saw that there is a strong positive
correlation between plant size and the wage of unskilled (as well as skilled) workers. Given the low unionization
rate, it does not seem likely that individual, non-union workers have the power to set higher wages at plants they
perceive to be facing less elastic demand.
28there should be a systematic relationship between price and plant size. One could assume that,
because of exogenous technological factors, the optimal plant size for producing goods with high
prices happens to be larger than the optimal size for producing goods with low prices, but this
is assuming what needs to be proved. In short, it seems dicult to explain the price-plant size
correlations we observe without reference to dierences in product quality.
This is not an argument against perfect competition per se. Even under perfect competition,
the correlations we observe may obtain if, for instance, producing higher-quality outputs requires
both (a) higher-quality inputs and (b) more recent-vintage technologies that have higher xed
costs and that particularly talented entrepreneurs are able to use at lower marginal cost.51 Such
a model, however, would retain two of the key features of our model: the fact that higher-quality
inputs are used to produce higher-quality outputs, and the reduced-form complementarity between
input quality and entrepreneurial capability (here mediated by technology choices).52 Our main
argument is not for or against a particular market structure or set of functional forms; it is that
the empirical patterns we observe are dicult to explain without these two features.
9 Robustness Checks
This section undertakes four additional robustness checks, the rst using an alternative two-
step estimation strategy, the second using an alternative measure of horizontal dierentiation, a
modied version of the Gollop-Monahan index, the third focusing on the subset of non-exporters,
and the fourth examining the relationship between prices and physical quantities at the product
level.
9.1 Two-Step Method
To explore the robustness of our baseline results, we generate analogous results using a two-step
method, estimating plant-average output and input prices in a rst stage and then estimating the
relationship between the plant-average prices and plant size in a second stage. Econometrically,
51In many cases, models based on monopolistic competition can be shown to be isomorphic to models based on
perfect competition, and this case is not an exception. See Atkeson and Kehoe (2005) for a related discussion.
52The second of these features is the crucial one. A wide variety of models could generate the prediction that
high-quality inputs are used in the production of high-quality outputs, and hence that input prices are positively
correlated with output prices. The more distinctive implication of our model, a consequence of the complementarity
between input quality and plant capability, is that both input and output prices are positively correlated with plant
capability and hence with plant size.
29the model is:
lnpijt = t + it + jt + uijt (10)
b OLS
jt = Xjt
 + rt + k + vjt (11)
where jt is a plant-year eect, and uijt and vjt are mean-zero disturbances. The rst-stage
estimates, b OLS
jt , can be interpreted as plant-average prices, controlling for product-year, region-
year and industry eects. Note again that these plant averages are identied by dierences between
the unit values of a given plant and unit values of other plants producing (or consuming) the same
products in the same year.53 All else equal, if the disturbances, uijt and vjt, are uncorrelated
with the co-variates, then the estimate of 
 from (11) and the one-step estimate of 
 from (9)
will converge asymptotically to the same estimate. (See Baker and Fortin (2001, pp. 358-359)
for a useful discussion of the relationship between such one-step and two-step estimators.) In our
case, the two-step model diers from the one-step model in that the two-step model weights each
plant-year observation equally in (11) whereas the one-step method weights each plant-product-
year observation equally, eectively placing more weight on plant-years with a greater number of
plant-product-year observations. Table 9 reports the two-step estimates corresponding to (10)-
(11). The estimates for the plant-average output price are smaller than those in Panel A of Table
3, but the preferred estimates in Columns 2-3 are nonetheless positive and signicant.54 The
estimates for the plant-average input price are nearly identical to those in Panel B of Table 3.
Overall, it is reassuring that the one-step and two-step methods are broadly consistent.55
53An important technical caveat is that identication of the plant-year and product-year eects in this model is
not assured. Intuitively, the issue is that if in a particular year a plant only produces one product, and in that year
the product is only produced by that plant, then it is not possible to identify the plant-year eect for that plant
separately from the product-year eect for that product. A similar issue arises in the literature using employer-
employee data to identify both plant and person eects (Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis, 1999). Generally speaking,
the plant-year eects can only be uniquely identied for plants that are in a connected \network" of plants, where
a plant is connected if it produces a good that is also produced by another plant in the network. To ensure this,
we nd the largest such network and drop the plants not in that connected set. This leads us to drop fewer than
5% of plant-year observations in the sample.
54Given the dierence in weighting between the one-step and two-step methods described above, it appears that
the dierences in estimates for outputs between Tables 3 and 9 are due to the fact that the output price-plant size
relationship is steeper among larger plants that produce more distinct products.
55In unreported results (available from the authors), we undertake an alternative estimation strategy, in which we
construct a T ornqvist output price index at the plant level, comparing unit values of each plant to industry-average
values, weighting each output by the share of plant revenues. Results are consistent with those reported here.
309.2 Gollop-Monahan Index
For robustness, we have also estimated the model of Table 7 using an alternative measure of
horizontal dierentiation derived from the Gollop and Monahan (1991) index.56 The Gollop-
Monahan index was originally designed to measure diversication across establishments of multi-
establishment rms, but it has also been used to measure horizontal dierentiation across rms
by Syverson (2004b). Following Bernard and Jensen (2007), we use one component of full three-
component index in Gollop and Monahan (1991). Details of the construction of this measure
appear in Appendix B.1. Intuitively, the measure uses the dissimilarity of input mixes across
plants within an industry to proxy for the horizontal dierentiation of outputs across plants.
Table 10 presents regressions similar to Columns 1, 4, 5, 6, 9 and 10 of Table 7 with the
Gollop-Monahan index as the measure of horizontal dierentiation. Although the point estimates
in Columns 2-3 and 5-6 are smaller than the corresponding estimates in Table 7, and the estimates
for advertising and R&D intensity are only marginally signicant, the results are largely consistent
with those using the Rauch measure. Indeed, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the estimates
on the interaction terms are the same using the Gollop-Monahan and Rauch indices. Note also
that the estimates for the log employment term without interactions in Columns 2-3 are again
negative and signicant, consistent with the corresponding estimates in Table 7 as well as with
our theoretical predictions.57
9.3 Results for Non-Exporters
A possible objection is that larger plants may tend to have higher output and input prices because
they are exporters and because per-unit transport costs lead plants to \ship the good apples out",
that is, export higher-quality varieties than they sell in the domestic market (Hummels and Skiba,
2004). In that case, the positive price-plant size correlations would be due to the transport costs,
not to the complementarity between input quality and plant productivity in producing output
quality.
To address this objection, we re-estimate our baseline model using only data from non-
exporting plants. Table 11 reports the results. Comparing to Table 3, we see that the point
estimates for output prices are slightly smaller and for input prices are slightly larger than for
the entire sample, but the overall message is that the positive price-plant size correlations are
56We are grateful to Chad Syverson for suggesting this alternative measure.
57The point estimates for the log employment term without interactions in the input-price regressions in Columns
5-6 are negative but not statistically dierent from zero, the theoretical prediction.
31robust and highly signicant, even among non-exporters. It does not appear that the shipping-
the-good-apples-out hypothesis can be the entire explanation for the price-plant size correlations
we observe.
9.4 Results Using Physical Quantities at Product Level
As a nal robustness check, we examine the relationship between prices and physical quantities at
the product level. As mentioned in Section 6 above, care must be exercised in drawing inferences
from the relationship between unit values and physical quantities: because unit values are calcu-
lated as revenues or expenditures divided by physical quantities, measurement error in physical
quantities will generate a spurious negative correlation with unit values. Column 1 of Table 12
reports regressions of the form of (9), but where log number of physical units is included in place
of plant size on the right-hand size. We indeed see that the coecient on log physical quantity is
negative and highly signicant both for outputs (Panel A) and for inputs (Panel B). Although we
do not have an instrument for physical quantities at the product level, log employment is avail-
able as an instrument at the plant level. When we use log employment as an instrument for log
physical quantities in Column 3, we nd that the estimated coecient on log physical quantities
becomes positive and signicant. The coecients are not statistically distinguishable from the
estimates using log revenues as the measure of plant size (in Column 3 of Table 3) nor, indeed,
from the reduced-form estimates in Column 2 of this table (which are the same as in Column 2 of
Table 3). It appears, in other words, that the negative coecients in Column 1 are due entirely
to the mechanical negative bias induced by measurement error; once that bias is eliminated, the
estimates using the component of physical quantities that is correlated with plant size are similar
to the estimates using the alternative methods above.
10 Conclusion
This paper has used uniquely rich and representative data from Colombia to test the quality-
complementarity hypothesis, the hypothesis that input quality and plant productivity are com-
plementary in producing output quality. We have provided a tractable, general-equilibrium for-
malization of the hypothesis, extending the Melitz (2003) model. We have three main ndings.
First, output prices and plant size (or export status) are positively correlated within narrow
industries on average. Second, input prices and plant size (or export status) are positively cor-
32related within narrow industries on average. Third, both patterns are stronger in industries that
have more scope for quality dierentiation as measured by the advertising and R&D intensity
of U.S. industries. We have also shown that the price-plant size correlations are not fully ex-
plained by market power of either suppliers or purchasers in input markets. These results are
consistent with the predictions of our model and dicult to reconcile with models that impose
homogeneity or symmetry of either inputs or outputs. We interpret the results as supportive of
the quality-complementarity hypothesis.
The quality-complementarity hypothesis carries a number of broader implications. In the
introduction we brie
y discussed two types, the rst concerning new channels through which
output and input markets may interact in response to trade liberalization, the second concerning
the generalization of the \employer size-wage eect" to material inputs. Here we consider an
additional implication: the quality-complementarity hypothesis points to shortcomings of widely
used methods of productivity estimation. A standard approach is to de
ate both output revenues
and input expenditures by sector-level price indices, and to estimate productivity as the residual
in a regression of log de
ated output revenues on log de
ated input expenditures. Katayama, Lu,
and Tybout (2006) have argued that even if the coecients of this regression can be estimated
consistently, the resulting productivity estimates confound (at least) four distinct dimensions of
heterogeneity across plants: (1) productive eciency, (2) mark-ups, (3) output quality, and (4)
input prices, which in part re
ect input quality. They also note that the mere availability of
data on physical units of inputs and outputs is not sucient to identify productive eciency
separately from the other factors without further homogeneity assumptions. While a number
of techniques have recently been developed to separate technical eciency and mark-ups (see
e.g. Melitz (2000), Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003)), comparatively little attention
has been paid to the quality dimensions, especially to the heterogeneity in input quality.58 Our
results provide empirical reinforcement for the argument that ignoring heterogeneity in output
and input quality may yield misleading inferences. We leave the further exploration of the broader
implications of the quality-complementarity hypothesis for future work.
58Exceptions include de Loecker (2007) and the Katayama, Lu, and Tybout (2006) paper itself, both of which
structurally estimate demand systems to help distinguish the contributions of mark-ups, demand shocks (i.e. output
quality) and productive eciency. A valid alternative approach has been to focus on homogeneous industries where
quality dierentiation is likely to be limited (Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson, 2008; Syverson, 2004a).
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37A Theory Appendix
A.1 Characterization of Equilibrium (cont.)
In this section of the appendix, we complete the characterization of equilibrium. As mentioned
above, we must impose an assumption on the \shape" parameter of the Pareto distribution in order
to ensure that both the distribution of capability draws and the distribution of plant revenues in
the nal-good sector have nite means, in our case that k > max(;1).
The fact that protability is monotonically increasing in  (which follows from the fact that
r() is monotonically increasing in ) implies that in each country in equilibrium there will be a
cut-o value of  for remaining in in the domestic market, call it ; plants will leave immediately
after receiving their capability draw if it is below . There is also a cut-o 
x for entering
the export market. The values of the cut-os (which, because of symmetry, are the same in each
country) are pinned down by three conditions. First, the prot of the plant on the margin between





  f = 0 (A1)
where r
d() represents revenues in the domestic market (given by (7d) when Z = 0). Second, the
additional prot of entering the export market for the plant on the margin between entering the







  fx = 0 (A2)
where r
x() represents revenues in the export market. Third, there is a free-entry condition: the
ex ante expected present discounted value of receiving a capability draw must be equal to the
investment cost required to receive the draw, such that ex ante expected prots are zero. Formally,























 fe = 0 (A3)
where E(r
d()) and E(r
x()) are the expected per-period revenues in the domestic and export



















, we have that E(r()) = k
k (f) and Ex(r()) = k
k (fx).























A particularly convenient feature of the Melitz (2003) framework which carries over to this model
is that these cut-o values do not depend on the scale of the economy.
Total payments by nal-good producers for material inputs are equal to total payments by
intermediate-input producers for labor-hours. The per-period xed costs, f and fx, are also paid
38to workers. Given the wage normalization, payments to workers are equal to the number of labor-
hours utilized. Thus the total eective utilization of labor-hours by existing nal-good producers
is the dierence between total revenues and total prots of nal-good producers. Total investment
costs paid by entrants, Mefe, are equal to labor-hours used to obtain initial productivity draws.
The labor market clearing condition is that total eective labor-hours utilization for nal-good
production plus labor-hours utilization for investment equals total labor supply, which is to say:
L = [ME(r()) + MxEx(r())   ] + Mefe (A6)
where  is total prots of nal-good producers.
In steady state, the mass of new entrants in each country | that is, potential entrepreneurs
who pay the investment cost to receive a capability draw and who have a capability above the
cut-o to remain in the market | is equal to the mass of plants that die:
Me (1   G()) = M (A7)
where Me is the mass of entrepreneurs who pay the investment cost and M is the mass of rms























Given the symmetry between countries, MxE(r
x()) is equal to domestic expenditures on foreign
varieties as well as export revenue of domestic rms, and (A9) is also the clearing condition for
the nal-good market: total income (and hence total expenditures) of workers is equal to total
revenues of nal-good producers.






















This completes the solution of the model.
A.2 \Quality" Melitz Model
This section spells out a \quality" interpretation of the Melitz (2003) model, which is alluded to
but not made explicit in Melitz's original paper. As mentioned in the text, when b = 0 our model
reduces to the Melitz (2003) model | to be precise, to the special case of the Melitz model with
a Pareto distribution of productivity draws and zero transport costs.59 Let '  a and express
59The Pareto distribution allows us to solve explicitly for the entry cut-os, but does not drive any of our key
results.
39other variables in terms of '. In this case, (1), (3) and (7a)-(7d) become:

































which correspond exactly to the Melitz (2003) model when transport costs are zero.
Now suppose that the above equations refer to goods measured in quality units, which we call
\utils". Suppose further that higher-' plants, in addition to requiring fewer units of inputs to
produce one util of output, also produce goods with more utils per physical unit, where utils per
physical unit are given by:
~ q(') = ' (A12)
The existence of a relationship of this kind is alluded to in Melitz (2003, p. 1699) but not explicitly
specied. Given (A12), price in physical units is given by:
~ p
O(') = p






The expression for revenues is unchanged by the redenition of units.
Several remarks are in order. First, if  > 1, then both output price in physical units and
revenues are increasing in ' and hence are positively correlated with one another. Note also that
setting  = 1 yields a model in which higher ' corresponds to higher quality but marginal cost
and hence output price in physical units are constant, as alluded to by Melitz (2003, p. 1699).
Second, this \quality" Melitz model is isomorphic to the quality model of Baldwin and Harri-
gan (2007, Section 4) if one abstracts from the dierences in distance between countries. Baldwin
and Harrigan's parameter a represents marginal cost, which here corresponds to ' 1, and their
 corresponds to 1
 1. Their assumption that  > 0 here corresponds to the condition that  > 1,
which guarantees that output price is increasing in '. The value-added of the Baldwin-Harrigan
model over this quality Melitz model is that it explicitly considers distance and the dierential
selection of higher-productivity rms into more-distant markets.
Third, the key dierence between this quality Melitz model (with  > 1) and the quality
model we present in this paper lies in the role of inputs. Here output price and marginal cost per
physical unit are increasing in ' because higher-' plants use more units of inputs of homogeneous
quality to produce each physical unit, rather than inputs of higher quality as in our model. (That
is, higher-' plants use fewer units of inputs per util, but since the number of utils per physical
unit increases in ' faster than input requirements decline, they use more physical units of inputs
per physical unit of output.)
Fourth, even if one were to introduce heterogeneity of inputs in this quality Melitz framework,
in the absence of the complementarity between plant capability and input quality, there would be
40no systematic reason for higher-' plants to use higher-quality inputs.
Fifth, a shortcoming of the quality Melitz/Baldwin-Harrigan framework for addressing issues
of quality dierentiation is that quality is a deterministic function of a plant's capability draw.
There is no quality choice. Hence quality does not depend on factors such as the technological
possibilities for upgrading quality or consumers' willingness to pay for such improvements, and
there is no endogenous variation in the extent of quality dierentiation across sectors.
B Data Appendix
B.1 Variable Denitions
Output unit value: Value of output of 8-digit product, divided by number of physical units
of product produced. Output is sales plus net intra-rm transfers plus net increase in
inventories. We also refer to the output unit value (somewhat loosely, since it represents an
average) as the output price. In 1998 Colombian pesos.
Input unit value: Value consumed of 8-digit product, divided by number of physical units of
product consumed. Consumption is purchases minus net intra-rm transfers minus net
increase in inventories. We also refer to the input unit value (somewhat loosely, since it
represents an average) as the input price. In 1998 Colombian pesos.
Total output: Total value of output of all products, valued at factory price. Total output is
sales plus net transfers to other plants in same rm plus net increases in inventories. In
billions of 1998 Colombian pesos.
Employment: The number of permanent, paid employees.
Exporter: Indicator variable taking the value 1 if plant has export sales > 0, and 0 otherwise.
Export share: Export sales as a fraction of total sales.
Average earnings: Total annual wage bill of permanent, remunerated workers, in millions of
1998 Colombian pesos, divided by total number of permanent, remunerated workers on Nov.
15 of corresponding year.
Average white-collar earnings: Annual wage bill of permanent, remunerated white-collar work-
ers, in millions of 1998 Colombian pesos, divided by number of permanent, remunerated
white-collar workers on Nov. 15 of corresponding year. White-collar workers dened as
managers (directivos), non-production salaried workers (empleados), and technical employ-
ees (t ecnicos). The white-collar/blue-collar distinction is available on a consistent basis only
for 1982-1994.
Average blue-collar earnings: Annual wage bill of permanent, remunerated blue-collar work-
ers, in millions of 1998 Colombian pesos, divided by number of permanent, remunerated
blue-collar workers on Nov. 15 of corresponding year. Blue-collar workers are dened as op-
erators (obreros and operarios) and apprentices (aprendices). The white-collar/blue-collar
distinction is available on a consistent basis only for 1982-1994.
Advertising/sales ratio: Ratio of advertising expenditures to total sales at sector level, from
the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 1975 Line of Business Survey. Converted from
FTC 4-digit industry classication to ISIC 4-digit rev. 2 classication using verbal industry
descriptions.
41Advertising and R&D/sales ratio: Ratio of advertising plus research and development (R&D)
expenditures to total sales, from the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 1975 Line of
Business Survey. Converted from FTC 4-digit industry classication to ISIC 4-digit rev. 2
classication using verbal industry descriptions.
Rauch (1999) measure of horizontal dierentiation: SITC 4-digit sectors classied by Rauch's
\liberal" classication as \homogeneous" or \reference-priced" are assigned 0, others are
assigned 1. SITC 4-digit industries were then converted to ISIC rev. 2 4-digit using concor-
dance from OECD, which generated some fractional values.
Modied Gollop-Monahan measure of dierentiation: Following Bernard and Jensen (2007),
we use just the \dissimilarity" component of the full Gollop and Monahan (1991) index. We












where i, j, k, and t index products, plants, 5-digit industries and years; sijkt is the expen-
diture share of plant j in industry k on input i in year t; and sik is the average expenditure
share on input i by all plants in industry k in all years.60
Herndahl index (of purchasers): Sum of squares of expenditure shares of purchasers of the
corresponding 8-digit input, where the expenditure share is the expenditure by a given
purchaser as a share of total expenditures on the good.
Herndahl index (of suppliers): Sum of squares of market shares of producers of the corre-
sponding 8-digit input.
Purchaser share: Expenditures on product by plant as a share of total expenditures on product
by all plants in a given year.
All monetary variables have been de
ated to constant 1998 values using the national producer
price index. Average 1998 exchange rate: 1,546 pesos/US$1.
B.2 Data Processing
The data we use in this paper are from the Encuesta Anual Manufacturera (EAM) [Annual
Manufacturing Survey]. Plant-level data are available over the 1977-2005 period, but product-
level data are available only for 1982-2005. The EAM is a census of all manufacturing plants
in Colombia with 10 or more workers, with the following qualication. Prior to 1992, the sole
criterion for initial inclusion of a plant in the census was that the plant have a total of 10 or more
employees.61 Beginning in 1992, an additional criterion was added: a plant would be included if
it had 10 or more workers or nominal value of total output (dened as in Appendix B.1) in excess
60Note that Gollop and Monahan (1991) construct a dissimilarity measure at the level of products, rather than
plants. But this requires information on the input mix for each product. To recover this information, Gollop and
Monahan (1991) focus on plants that produce only the particular product for which they need information on the
input mix. This solution seems unattractive, since plants producing only a particular good are a selected subsample
of the set of plants producing that good. Instead of following this solution, we calculate the index of dissimilarity
at the plant level, where the input mix is observed for all plants.
61This was the sole criterion over the 1970-1992 period. Prior to 1970, an additional output criterion had been
in place.
42of 65 million Colombian pesos (approx. US$95,000) (DANE, 2004, p. 8). The monetary limit has
been raised in nominal terms over time. There are two exceptions to these rules. First, once a
plant is included in the sample it is followed over time until it goes out of business, regardless of
whether the criteria for inclusion continue to be satised. Second, multi-plant rms are included,
even if not all plants satisfy one of the above criteria. To maintain consistency of the sample over
time, we removed all plants with fewer than 10 employees.62
The longitudinal links between plant-level observations we use are those that are reported
directly by DANE. In 1991 and again in 1992, plant identication numbers were changed, with
the result that it was no longer possible to follow some plants over time, despite the fact that
they remained in the dataset.63
From 1982-2000, the product-level data were reported using an 8-digit classication system
with four digits from the International Standard Industrial Classication (ISIC) revision 2 and
four Colombia-specic digits (one of which is only used for verication purposes).64 In 2001, a
new classication was constructed, with the rst ve digits based on the U.N. Central Product
Classication (CPC) version 1.0 and two Colombia-specic digits. We used a concordance pro-
vided by DANE to convert back to the earlier product classication. There are approximately
6,000 distinct product categories.
To construct a plant's 5 digit industry, we aggregated revenues within plants across all years
from the 8-digit to the 5-digit level, then chose the 5-digit category with the greatest share of total
revenues. Our industry categories thus do not change over time within plant. Note, however, that
plants continually changes their output and input mixes, and these changes are accommodated
by our econometric procedure.
To reduce the in
uence of measurement error and outliers, we carried out the following addi-
tional cleaning procedures:
1. In the plant-level le, we dropped any plant-year observation for which a key variable |
total output, employment, white-collar wage, blue-collar wage or average wage | diered
by more than a factor of 5 from adjacent periods.65
2. In the plant-level le, we dropped plants that were reported to be cooperatives, publicly
owned, or owned by a religious organization.
3. In the plant-level le, we \winsorized" the data within each year (Angrist and Krueger,
1999) for total output, employment, white-collar wage, blue-collar wage or average wage,
setting all values below the 1st percentile to the value at the 1st percentile, and all values
above the 99th percentile to the 99th percentile.
62In implementing this criterion, we followed DANE's denition and counted all employees, including those that
are unpaid or temporary.
63Eslava, Haltiwanger, Kugler, and Kugler (2004) construct some links probabilistically (see the data appendix
of that paper); we use only the links constructed on the basis of name, address and telephone information.
64The Spanish acronym for this classication system is CIIU2AC, for Clasicaci on Internacional Industrial Uni-
forme revisi on 2 adaptada para Colombia [ISIC revision 2 adapted for Colombia].
65To be precise, an observation was dropped if one of the following criteria was met: (a) the plant-year observation
diered by more than a factor of 5 from both the previous and the subsequent year; (b) the observation diered by
more than a factor of 5 from the previous year and data for the subsequent year was missing; (c) the observation
diered by more than a factor of 5 from the subsequent year and data for the previous year was missing; (d)
the observation diered by more than a factor of 5 from the subsequent year but not the previous year and the
subsequent year did not dier by more than a factor of 5 from the following year; or (e) the observation diered by
more than a factor of 5 from the previous year but not the subsequent year and the previous year did not dier by
more than a factor of 5 from the preceding year.
434. In the product-level le, we dropped product-year observations that were not assigned to
any 8-digit product code (i.e. that were in a \not elsewhere classied" category with no
information on industry).
5. In the product-level le, we dropped information on unit values for subcontracted outputs
or inputs, since the reported value typically does not re
ect the market price. (The product-
level data contain an identier to indicate whether the good is produced or purchased under
a sub-contracting arrangement.) Goods produced under subcontract are included in total
output, however.
6. In the product-level le, we dropped product-year observations reporting values of revenues
or expenditures or physical quantities equal to the integers 1, 2 or 3. These observations
were responsible for many of the most severe outliers in the raw data. The integer values 1,
2, and 3 appear to be reporting or transcription errors.
7. In the product-level le, we winsorized real output and input unit values within product,
separately for outputs and inputs. Because of the small number of observations for many
product-years and the noise in the unit value information, we winsorized within product for
all years together and at the 5th and 95th percentiles, rather than 1st and 99th as above.
8. In the product-level le, we carried out an additional winsorizing procedure, winsorizing
observations on log real unit values that diered from the mean by 5 times the standard
deviation for log real unit values within product, separately for outputs and inputs.
9. In the plant-level and product-level les, we dropped observations corresponding to any
plant that did not have complete information on key variables: total output, employment,
white-collar wage, blue-collar wage, average wage, output prices and quantities and input
prices and quantities.
As discussed in footnote 53 above, in order to carry out the estimation of plant-year eects
in the two-step method in Section 9.1, plants must be in a connected \network" of plants, where
a plant is connected if it produces a good that is also produced by another plant in the network.
More than 95% of plants are in the largest such chain. In order to maintain as consistent a sample
as possible across dierent specications, we use only the \connected" plants also when using the
one-step procedure described by equation (9).
We refer to the unbalanced panel consisting of all plant-year observations that survive the
cleaning procedure as the 1982-2005 panel. We refer to the subset of observations of that panel
that contain complete information on exports, white-collar and blue-collar earnings (which are
only available on a consistent basis for the period 1982-1994) as the 1982-1994 panel.66
The primary sub-national administrative region in Colombia is the departamento, of which
there are 32 plus the federal district of Bogot a. Four departamentos have zero plants in our
sample. Another eight little-populated departamentos | Amazonas, Arauca, Caqueta, Casanar e,
Choc o, La Guajira, Putumayo, and San Andres | together have just 184 plant-year observations
in the entire 1982-2005 panel. We aggregated these eight departamentos into a single region.
66Information on exports and imported inputs is also available in 2000-2005, but the information is collected in
a dierent way and there appear to be incomparabilities between the 1982-1994 and 2000-2005 values.
44Figure 1:
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−3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3
log employment, deviated from year means
x=non−exporter, o=exporter; slope=−0.247, se=0.103
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Summary statistics, plant-level data
1982-1994 panel 1982-2005 panel
non-exporters exporters all plants all plants
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Output 2.77 11.98 4.35 5.47
(0.04) (0.19) (0.05) (0.04)
Employment 56.65 193.16 79.98 70.40
(0.40) (2.06) (0.53) (0.34)
Avg. earnings 3.26 4.66 3.50 4.39
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
White-collar earnings 4.36 6.62 4.75
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
Blue-collar earnings 2.77 3.47 2.89
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
White-collar/blue-collar earnings ratio 1.62 1.97 1.68
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
White-collar employment share 0.29 0.33 0.30
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Number of output categories 3.44 4.49 3.62 3.61
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01)
Number of input categories 10.29 17.10 11.46 11.69
(0.03) (0.15) (0.04) (0.03)
Export share of sales 0.17
(0.00)
Import share of input expenditures 0.06 0.23 0.09
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
N (plant-year obs.) 49546 10216 59762 114500
N (distinct plants) 9352 2308 10106 13582
Notes: Standard errors of means in parentheses. Exporter dened as export sales > 0. Export share is fraction of
total sales derived from exports. Output is annual sales, measured in billions of 1998 Colombian pesos. Earnings
are annual, measured in millions of 1998 pesos. Average 1998 exchange rate: 1,546 pesos/US$1. Number of output
or input categories refers to number of distinct categories in which non-zero revenues or expenditures are reported.
See Appendix B.1 for more detailed variable descriptions and Appendix B.2 for details of data processing.Table 2:
Summary statistics, product-level data, by ISIC 3-digit industry, 1982-2005 panel



























ISIC rev. 2 major group (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Food 446 43.82 0.51 0.46 124.60 0.55 0.51
Beverages 32 34.15 0.50 0.44 73.64 0.57 0.49
Tobacco 5 3.16 0.35 0.29 2.31 0.77 0.60
Textiles 227 10.60 0.72 0.64 240.99 0.80 0.78
Apparel, exc. footwear 171 38.08 0.58 0.55 27.85 0.71 0.67
Leather prod., exc. footwear/apparel 71 13.35 0.86 0.70 124.41 0.83 0.61
Footwear, exc. rubber/plastic 28 43.89 0.49 0.46 39.39 0.94 0.90
Wood products, exc. furniture 77 21.54 1.07 0.95 121.04 0.87 0.81
Furniture, exc. metal 79 54.25 0.89 0.85 3.86 0.88 0.61
Paper products 138 22.36 0.98 0.84 363.01 0.91 0.89
Printing and publishing 83 79.90 1.22 1.15 505.76 1.10 1.08
Industrial chemicals 277 5.17 0.78 0.67 102.86 0.85 0.81
Other chemical products 220 15.05 0.83 0.78 198.99 0.86 0.82
Petroleum reneries 29 1.38 0.89 0.28 70.66 0.87 0.83
Misc. petroleum/coal products 16 8.12 0.80 0.71 154.99 0.68 0.66
Rubber products 82 7.35 0.74 0.64 105.06 0.94 0.91
Plastic products 232 19.03 1.00 0.87 331.10 0.95 0.91
Pottery, china, earthenware 26 3.03 0.75 0.52 10.07 1.25 1.06
Glass products 85 4.47 0.86 0.71 51.44 0.89 0.85
Other non-metallic mineral products 110 13.94 0.71 0.62 48.30 0.92 0.85
Iron and steel basic industries 61 12.66 0.93 0.81 143.57 0.77 0.75
Non-ferrous metal basic industries 97 4.51 0.78 0.61 44.56 0.75 0.70
Metal prod., exc. machinery/equip. 406 13.72 1.05 0.97 210.26 1.00 0.95
Machinery, exc. electrical 285 7.12 1.33 1.18 27.02 1.37 1.28
Electrical machinery 168 6.40 1.41 1.26 161.88 1.30 1.22
Transport equipment 180 5.87 0.98 0.79 5.18 1.20 0.96
Professional equipment, n.e.c. 79 3.36 1.23 0.92 11.51 1.29 1.12
Other manufactures 172 7.05 1.14 0.99 137.81 0.95 0.89
All sectors 3882 30.06 0.87 0.79 193.30 0.87 0.83
Notes: Number of products is number of distinct products with non-zero sales in any year. Average number of selling or
purchasing plants is average (across 8-digit products) of number of distinct plants selling or purchasing product in each year.
Within-product and within-product-year standard deviations are calculated as standard deviations of residuals from regression
of log real prices on sets of product eects or product-year eects, respectively. Averages assign equal weight to each plant-
product-year observation in product-level data on outputs (Columns 2-4) or inputs (Columns 5-7). See Appendix B.2 for
details of data processing.Table 3:
Product-level prices vs. plant size, 1982-2005 panel
OLS Reduced form IV
(1) (2) (3)
A. Dependent variable: log real output unit value




product-year eects Y Y Y
industry eects Y Y Y
region-year eects Y Y Y
R2 0.90 0.90
N (obs.) 413789 413789 413789
N (plants) 13582 13582 13582
B. Dependent variable: log real input unit value




product-year eects Y Y Y
industry eects Y Y Y
region-year eects Y Y Y
R2 0.78 0.78
N (obs.) 1338921 1338921 1338921
N (plants) 13582 13582 13582
Notes: Total output is total value of production, dened as sales plus net transfers plus net change in inventories.
In Column 3, log employment is instrument for log total output; the coecient on log employment, its robust
standard error and the R
2 in the rst stage are 1.058, 0.011 and 0.733 in Panel A and 1.082, 0.010 and 0.782 in
Panel B, respectively. Product-year and industry eects are not perfectly collinear because industry is dened as
the industry category with the greatest share of plant sales, and two plants producing the same product may be in
dierent industries. Errors clustered at plant level. N (plants) reports number of clusters (i.e. distinct plants that
appear in any year). Robust standard errors in brackets. *10% level, **5% level, ***1% level. See Appendix B.1
for more detailed variable descriptions and Appendix B.2 for details of data processing.Table 4:
Product-level prices vs. plant size and exporting variables, 1982-1994 panel
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Dependent variable: log real output price




export share 0.288** 0.251*
(0.137) (0.142)
product-year eects Y Y Y Y Y
industry eects Y Y Y Y Y
region-year eects Y Y Y Y Y
R2 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90
N (obs.) 216155 216155 216155 216155 216155
N (plants) 10106 10106 10106 10106 10106
B. Dependent variable: log real input price




export share 0.021 -0.002
(0.027) (0.027)
product-year eects Y Y Y Y Y
industry eects Y Y Y Y Y
region-year eects Y Y Y Y Y
R2 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80
N (obs.) 684746 684746 684746 684746 684746
N (plants) 10106 10106 10106 10106 10106
Notes: Exporter equals 1 if plant has exports>0, and 0 otherwise. Export share is fraction of total sales derived from
exports. Product-year and industry eects are not perfectly collinear because industry is dened as the industry
category with the greatest share of plant sales, and two plants producing the same product may be in dierent
industries. Errors clustered at plant level. N (plants) reports number of clusters (i.e. distinct plants that appear
in any year). Robust standard errors in parentheses. *10% level, **5% level, ***1% level. See Appendix B.1 for















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ISIC rev. 2 major group (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
311-312 Food 0.026 0.029 0.35 0.24 0.45
313 Beverages 0.045 0.046 0.68 0.20 0.70
314 Tobacco 0.076 0.082 0.25 0.62 0.74
321 Textiles 0.014 0.019 0.88 0.30 0.27
322 Apparel, exc. footwear 0.015 0.018 1.00 0.17 0.93
323 Leather prod., exc. footwear/apparel 0.000 0.002 0.67 0.36 0.24
324 Footwear, exc. rubber/plastic 0.015 0.017 1.00 0.22 0.24
331 Wood products, exc. furniture 0.002 0.005 0.58 0.29 0.50
332 Furniture, exc. metal 0.014 0.019 1.00 0.13 0.83
341 Paper products 0.002 0.006 0.30 0.33 0.13
342 Printing and publishing 0.028 0.041 0.86 0.18 0.50
351 Industrial chemicals 0.005 0.029 0.18 0.57 0.35
352 Other chemical products 0.083 0.107 0.95 0.36 0.46
353 Petroleum reneries 0.002 0.004 0.09 0.88 0.38
355 Rubber products 0.012 0.026 1.00 0.43 0.40
356 Plastic products 0.008 0.031 0.79 0.33 0.28
361 Pottery, china, earthenware 0.007 0.020 1.00 0.56 0.92
362 Glass products 0.008 0.046 1.00 0.51 0.38
369 Other non-metallic mineral products 0.006 0.017 0.68 0.32 0.54
371 Iron and steel basic industries 0.001 0.006 0.25 0.41 0.22
372 Non-ferrous metal basic industries 0.002 0.011 0.02 0.60 0.33
381 Metal prod., exc. machinery/equip. 0.011 0.018 0.79 0.46 0.34
382 Machinery, exc. electrical 0.007 0.028 1.00 0.49 0.55
383 Electrical machinery 0.009 0.031 0.98 0.49 0.57
384 Transport equipment 0.008 0.033 1.00 0.51 0.75
385 Professional equipment, n.e.c. 0.013 0.052 0.99 0.66 0.70
390 Other manufactures 0.040 0.052 0.90 0.45 0.89
All sectors 0.020 0.029 0.74 0.28 0.43
Notes: Advertising intensity dened as ratio of advertising expenditures to total industry sales and advertising and R&D
intensity dened as ratio of advertising and R&D expenditures to total industry sales, using data from the U.S. Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) 1975 Line of Business Survey, converted from FTC 4-digit industry classication to ISIC 4-digit
rev. 2 classication using verbal industry descriptions. At SITC 4-digit level, Rauch (1999) measure set to 0 if good is
\homogeneous" or \reference-priced" according to the Rauch \liberal" denition, to 1 if reported not to be in either category,
and then concorded to ISIC rev. 2 4-digit categories. Herndahl index of suppliers is sum of squared market shares of producers
of product, by 5-digit industry. Herndahl index of purchasers is sum of squared expenditure shares of purchasers of product,
by 5-digit industry. Averages assign equal weight to each plant-product-year observation in the product-level data on outputs.




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Plant-average prices vs. plant size, 1982-2005 panel
OLS Reduced form IV
(1) (2) (3)
A. Dependent variable: plant-average output price




industry eects Y Y Y
region-year eects Y Y Y
R2 0.44 0.44
N (obs.) 114500 114500 114500
N (plants) 13582 13582 13582
B. Dependent variable: plant-average input price




industry eects Y Y Y
region-year eects Y Y Y
R2 0.33 0.33
N (obs.) 114500 114500 114500
N (plants) 13582 13582 13582
Notes: Plant-average output (input) price dened as coecient on plant-year eect from product-level regression of
log real output (input) unit values on full sets of plant-year and product-year eects. (Refer to equations (10)-(11)
in Section 9.1 of text.) Total output is total value of production, dened as sales plus net transfers plus net change
in inventories. In Column 3, log employment is instrument for log total output; the coecient on log employment,
its robust standard error and the R
2 in the rst stage are 1.067, 0.008 and 0.664, respectively. Errors clustered at
plant level. N (plants) reports number of clusters (i.e. distinct plants that appear in any year). Robust standard
errors in parentheses. *10% level, **5% level, ***1% level. See Appendix B.1 for more detailed variable descriptions










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Product-level prices vs. plant size, non-exporters only, 1982-1994 panel
OLS Reduced form IV
(1) (2) (3)
A. Dependent variable: log real output unit value




product-year eects Y Y Y
industry eects Y Y Y
region-year eects Y Y Y
R2 0.91 0.91
N (obs.) 170261 170261 170261
N (plants) 9352 9352 9352
B. Dependent variable: log real input unit value




product-year eects Y Y Y
industry eects Y Y Y
region-year eects Y Y Y
R2 0.81 0.81
N (obs.) 510011 510011 510011
N (plants) 9352 9352 9352
Notes: Specications are the same as in Table 3, but only include non-exporting plants (i.e. plants with zero
exports). Total output is total value of production, dened as sales plus net transfers plus net change in inventories.
In Column 3, log employment is instrument for log total output; the coecient on log employment, its robust
standard error and the R
2 in the rst stage are 1.136, 0.010 and 0.777 in Panel A and 1.165, 0.009 and 0.832 in
Panel B, respectively. Product-year and industry eects are not perfectly collinear because industry is dened as
the industry category with the greatest share of plant sales, and two plants producing the same product may be in
dierent industries. Errors clustered at plant level. N (plants) reports number of clusters (i.e. distinct plants that
appear in any year). Robust standard errors in brackets. *10% level, **5% level, ***1% level. See Appendix B.1
for more detailed variable descriptions and Appendix B.2 for details of data processing.Table 12:
Product-level prices vs. physical quantities, 1982-2005 panel
OLS Reduced form IV
(1) (2) (3)
A. Dependent variable: log real output unit value




product-year eects Y Y Y
industry eects Y Y Y
region-year eects Y Y Y
R2 0.91 0.90
N (obs.) 413789 413789 413789
N (plants) 13582 13582 13582
B. Dependent variable: log real input unit value




product-year eects Y Y Y
industry eects Y Y Y
region-year eects Y Y Y
R2 0.80 0.78
N (obs.) 1338921 1338921 1338921
N (plants) 13582 13582 13582
Notes: Physical quantity is number of physical units reported. In Column 3, log employment is instrument for log
physical quantity; the coecient on log employment, its robust standard error and the R
2 in the rst stage are
0.789, 0.013 and 0.247 in Panel A and 0.744, 0.011 and 0.25 in Panel B, respectively. Product-year and industry
eects are not perfectly collinear because industry is dened as the industry category with the greatest share of
plant sales, and two plants producing the same product may be in dierent industries. Errors clustered at plant
level. N (plants) reports number of clusters (i.e. distinct plants that appear in any year). Robust standard errors
in brackets. *10% level, **5% level, ***1% level. See Appendix B.1 for more detailed variable descriptions and
Appendix B.2 for details of data processing.